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ur lives are characterized by a constant stream of 
decisions and many are made in the context of social 
interaction. For example, a person who has to decide 
whether to trust an investor with her money or a negotiator 
who must choose whether to concede to the demands of the 
other party. These interactions are important as they provide 
people with the opportunity to realize goals that cannot be 
attained individually. However, these interactions are often 
complex since the real intentions of those involved are usually 
unknown or intentionally hidden. For example, in negotiations, 
sellers normally conceal their lowest acceptable selling price, 
and similarly, buyers conceal the maximum price they are 
willing to pay. As a consequence, both parties need to rely on 
implicit cues to infer each other’s price limits. The aim of this 
dissertation is twofold. I explore in a variety of social 
interactions (1) how people rely on various cues that people 
employ to make sense of their social situation and (2) how 
these cues influence subsequent decisions like whom to reward 
or punish, with whom to cooperate or with whom to negotiate.  
The outline of the remainder of the introductory chapter 
is as follows. I first elaborate on defining the various strategies 
that people use in making sense of their social situation and 
how it affects decisions in a variety of areas. Next, I introduce 
the consequences of this process in the dissertation’s areas of 
interest. That is, how are people guided by situational cues that 
affect decisions like whom to punish, with whom to cooperate 
or with whom to negotiate. Finally, a brief overview of each of 





Going beyond the information given 
 
Social sense making refers to the process by which people 
provide meaning to their social experiences by ‘going beyond 
the information given’ (Bruner, 1957). Specifically, many of the 
things we want to know about others are not directly 
perceivable. For example, can we trust strangers who claim to 
be trustworthy or is a suspect indeed guilty? In order to 
understand these hidden qualities of others, people often rely 
(justly or unjustly) on perceivable cues that allow them to 
develop an understanding of the quality of interest.  
An important perceivable cue that people use as source of 
information is the face of others and its expressions (Ekman, 
1992, 1993). For instance, Darwin (1872,1962) already noted 
that people use facial cues, such as an adverting eye gaze, to 
infer a person’s guilt. In a similar vein, recent research by Willis 
and Todorov (2006) revealed that people automatically attend 
to specific facial features in order to determine a stranger’s 
trustworthiness. In one of their experiments, participants were 
exposed to unknown faces for 100 milliseconds and had to 
judge the trustworthiness of the person. The result indicated 
that these judgments correlated highly with judgments made in 
the absence of any time constraints (the question whether 
these judgments are indeed reliable is a different matter).   
Research suggests that people not only attend to physical 
features but also make trait inferences by attending to the 
actions of others. Heider (1944, 1958) was probably the first to 
recognize that people extract information about other’s 
dispositions from observed acts. In their seminal experiment, 
Heider and Simmel (1944) asked participants to watch a movie 
in which three geometrical figures were shown moving in 
various directions at various speeds. Participants were 




picture” (p. 245). Only one participant described the actual 
content of the scene (i.e., geometric figures moving around). All 
other participants described it in term of actions of animated 
characters, attributing motivational and emotional states to the 
figures in explaining the observed movements (e.g., the triangle 
is ‘chasing’ the circle because the triangle is angry). Overall, 
these results support the notion that people go beyond the 
information given by attending to cues that provide meaning to 
their social experiences. Next I discuss the implications of this 
process in various domains of interest.       
 
Going beyond the information given in judicial 
decisions 
 
One domain in which people are not expected to go 
beyond the information given is the area of legal decision 
making. Legal decision makers are expected to apply legal 
reasons to the facts of a case in a rational manner. However, to 
what extent are judges, juries and eyewitnesses susceptible to 
extraneous factors when reconstructing or evaluating legal 
cases?  
Loftus and Palmer (1974) were among the first to show 
how random factors in courtroom procedures systematically 
influenced eyewitnesses testimonies. For instance, in one of 
their experiments, all participants saw the same film of a car 
accident and were subsequently asked how fast both cars were 
driving. Unbeknown to participants, the authors had several 
conditions in how they asked participants to estimate the 
driving speeds. In one version, participants had to estimate the 
driving speeds when they ‘smashed’ into each other while 
others had to estimate the speeds when they collided, bumped, 
hit, or contacted. The results showed that the driving speeds 




‘smashed’ question while lowest when the question was framed 
as ‘contacted’. Importantly, one week later, participants who 
answered the ‘smashed’ question were much more likely to 
remember, erroneously, that there was broken glass present in 
the accident. These results indicate that eyewitness testimonies 
may be guided, among other things, by (normatively) arbitrary 
cues like the wording of questions that significantly shaped 
their experiences and recollections of the incident. In Chapter 2 
of this dissertation, I provide evidence for another arbitrary 
cue that legal decision makers use when evaluating the severity 
of moral transgressions. That is, Chapter 2 provides evidence 
that people impose milder punishments for identical crimes in 
which the victim happened to be insured as opposed to 
uninsured. However, before explaining Chapter 2 in detail, let 
us first explore how people develop an understanding of 
situations in the other areas of interest of this dissertation, 
namely strategic interdependent situations.   
      
Going beyond the information given in 
interdependent situations 
 
Interdependent situations are social interactions where 
individuals share and exchange resources in order to obtain 
mutually beneficial outcomes. A key component of these 
situations is that they are characterized by mixed motives. On 
one hand, parties have the incentive to collaborate to attain 
mutually beneficial goals. On the other hand, parties typically 
have the egocentric (often hidden) incentive to increase 
personal gain at the expense of one’s interaction partner. As a 
consequence, people extensively rely on nonverbal cues of 
others in such situations to develop an understanding of the 
counterpart’s intentions and motives. For example, in testing 




Kleef, DeDreu, and Manstead (2004) asked participants to 
continue negotiating with a seller who initially reacted either 
angry or happy to the participant’s starting bid. The results 
showed that participants who were negotiating with an angry 
seller subsequently made the largest price concessions while 
those negotiating with happy sellers made the smallest ones. In 
explaining these findings, the  authors indicated that a seller’s 
emotional reaction to the initial bid implicitly revealed the 
seller’s price limits that buyers took into account in 
determining subsequent bids.  
Similar signaling effects were found by McCabe, Rigdon, 
and Smith (2003) in the domain of human cooperation (see 
also Camerer, 1988 for comparable signaling effects in gift 
giving). In explaining why people positively reciprocate trust, 
the authors found that trustees were more likely to honor trust 
when trust was voluntary (in the sense that the trustor also had 
the opportunity not to trust) as opposed to involuntary. In 
explaining this difference, the authors argued that a voluntary 
act of trust has the ability to signal that the trustor wants to 
cooperate and arrive at the mutually beneficial outcome. An 
involuntary act of trust is unable to signal such intentions since 
the trustor has no choice but to cooperate. Overall, these 
results again provide support for the notion that people ‘go 
beyond the information given' by attending to cues that allow 
them to develop an understanding of the intentions and 
motives of others. In Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation I 
discuss similar findings in the domain of human cooperation 
and negotiations. In what follows, I present a brief overview of 








Overview of the chapters 
 
Each chapter contains between four and nine studies, 
twenty in total. The chapters and studies illustrate the diversity 
of circumstances in which people provide meaning to their 
social interactions by relying on cues that emerge in the 
situation. Each chapter represents an individual article that is 
either published or submitted for publication.  
Chapter 2. In this chapter I tested empirically how legal 
decision makers determine the amount of punishment a 
perpetrator deserves by relying on cues like the insurance 
status of victims. The starting point was the observation that 
most legal systems are rooted in the premise that punishments 
should be proportional to the harm caused. The roots of this 
directive are closely associated with  the tendency of people to 
respond to unkindness with a similar degree of unkindness 
(the eye-for-an-eye principle; see Carlsmith, Darley, & 
Robinson, 2002). Although this imperative makes sense, 
mechanisms like insurance have become wildly available that 
alleviate the harm of victims. What are the consequences of 
compensating victims by means of insurance in how people 
evaluate and punish immoral acts? This chapter provides the 
first empirical support that compensating harm may not only 
change the consequences for victims but also for perpetrators. 
In particular, using a variety of different transgressions and 
punishments, this chapter demonstrates that people impose 
milder punishments when the victim happened to be insured as 
opposed to uninsured. 
Chapter 3. Whereas Chapter 2 explored the role of 
insurance in the legal domain, this chapter investigates its role 
in trust relationships. The chapter builds on the idea that 
trusting others carries some degree of risk and a common 




Employing the trust game (e.g., Dasgupta, 1988; Berg, Dickhaut, 
& McCabe, 1995), I test the conjecture that trustees become 
more likely to act opportunistically when trustors choose to be 
insured against the risk of betrayal. The presumed safeguard 
against the risk of betrayal is thus expected to increase the 
probability of betrayal. Indeed, although insurance made 
betrayal less costly, the studies in this chapter demonstrated 
that it also makes it more likely under certain circumstances. In 
explaining this, this chapter provides support for the 
hypothesis that trustees become less cooperative because by 
choosing insurance, trustors implicitly signal that they expect 
the trustee to behave opportunistically, encouraging trustees 
not to cooperate.  
Chapter 4. In the final empirical chapter, the role of 
another cue that frequently arises in interdependent situations 
is examined, namely the decision time of others. Specifically, I 
test the conjecture  that people perceive the time that others 
need in reaching a decision as indicative of the doubt that the 
decision makers experienced. In nine experiments I show that 
these inferred perceptions of doubt have a variety of 
consequences like with whom people want to cooperate or 
negotiate. 
Chapter 5. The overall empirical work presented in 
chapters 2-4 is examined in the final chapter. Specifically, 
Chapter 5 contains a summary of the findings and a conclusion 
in which the implications of this dissertation for theory and 
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Chapter 2  
The insured victim effect 
 
Abstract: An insurance policy may not only affect the 
consequences for victims but also for perpetrators. In six 
experiments I find that people recommend milder punishments 
for perpetrators when the victim was insured, although people 
believe that a sentence should not depend on the victim’s 
insurance status. The robustness of this effect is demonstrated 
by showing that recommendations can even be more lenient 
for crimes that are in fact more serious but in which the victim 
was insured. Moreover, even when harm was possible but did 
not materialize, people still prefer to punish crimes less 
severely when the (potential) victim was insured. The final two 
experiments suggest that the effect is associated with a change 
in (1) one’s compassion for the victim and (2) the perceived 
severity of the transgression. Implications of this phenomenon 







This chapter is based on: Van de Calseyde, P.P.F.M., Keren, G., & Zeelenberg, M. (2013c).  
The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment 




he costly consequences of negative events may be 
compensated for by insurances. As such, an insurance 
policy lowers the risk of the insured. However, 
research has shown that controlling risk via insurances also 
comes at a cost. For example, when buying insurance, people 
tend to make decisions that are incompatible with rational 
choice theory (see Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 
1993). In this chapter, I address a very different potential cost 
of insurance, namely, whether people would recommend lower 
punishments for crimes in which the victim was insured as 
opposed to uninsured. Interest in this issue stems from the fact 
that compensating harm may change the victim’s outcome, yet 
it does not alter the severity of the crime. It only implies a 
transfer of the negative consequences from the victim to the 
insurance company. When victim compensation from insurance 
indeed improves the perpetrator’s outcome, the insurance 
policy may prove to be a safeguard for the perpetrator as well.   
In essence, an insurance policy is a safety mechanism by 
which a third party (the insurance company) undertakes to 
guarantee an insured party against losses that may be incurred 
by misfortunes. Insurance thus changes the severity of an 
unfortunate outcome by providing financial compensation in 
the event that a specific hazard occurs. A large stream of 
literature in both economics and psychology has focused on 
understanding the consequences of insurance from the 
perspective of the insured party (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; 
Tykocinski, 2008; Hsee & Kunreuther, 2000; Johnson et al., 
1993). For example, one of the unwanted side effects of 
insurance is the phenomenon of moral hazard. It refers to the 
increased risk taking by individuals for whom the 
consequences of risk are reduced which, in turn, increases the 
probability that misfortune will strike. Research revealed a 
positive correlation between accidents and car insurance 
T 
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benefits and a positive correlation between health insurance 
and unhealthy lifestyles (e.g., Stanciole, 2007; Dave & Kaestner, 
2009). In addition, Tykocinski (2008) found that reminding 
people of their insurance policy lowered their perceived 
likelihood that misfortune will befall them (but see Van 
Wolferen, Inbar & Zeelenberg, 2013). Together, these findings 
suggest that being insured may create an illusory sense of 
safety resulting in detrimental behavioral consequences.  
I build upon this prior work and extend it in order to 
understand the interpersonal consequences of insurance. 
Specifically, I investigate whether people would recommend 
different punishments for crimes in which the victim was 
insured as opposed to uninsured. To illustrate this point, 
imagine two thieves both of whom stole an identical digital 
camera from two different people. One of the victims happened 
to be insured against theft while the other was not. Two related 
questions can be raised concerning the punishment the thieves 
deserve: (1) should they be punished equally (the normative 
question) and (2) will they be punished equally (the descriptive 
question)? Building on prior work on how the outcome of 
victims may influence sentencing decisions (see Gino, Shu, & 
Bazerman, 2010; Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 2009; Berg-Cross, 
1975), I find that (1) although people believe that sentencing 
should not depend on whether a victim was insured or not, (2) 
people nonetheless recommend lower punishments for 
perpetrators when the victim was insured as opposed to 
uninsured. 
Harm and punishment 
 
Harm and punishment are intimately related. When a 
person is unjustly harmed, people experience a strong desire to 
punish the wrongdoer (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002) 




punishment. In fact, legal systems are often rooted in the 
premise that punishments should be proportional to the harm 
caused (e.g., an eye for an eye) and there is widespread 
consensus that this ‘just deserts’ principle is a justified moral 
rule (see Carlsmith et al., 2002). However, using the severity of 
harm as a guide may also prompt people to use the victim’s 
outcome in a manner that can sometimes be normatively 
irrelevant (see Gino et al., 2009, 2010; Paharia, Kassam, Greene, 
& Bazerman, 2009; McCaffery, Kahneman, & Spitzer, 1995; 
Berg-Cross, 1975). For example, research by Cushman, Dreber, 
Wang, and Costa (2009) indicates that people punish behaviors 
that accidentally resulted in small detrimental consequences 
less harsh as compared to similar acts that by accident resulted 
in large consequences. In a similar vein, multiple studies by 
Gino and colleagues (2010) reveal that people are less likely to 
punish unfair behaviors when the unfairness happened to 
produce positive rather than negative consequences for a 
victim. Together, these studies suggest that people use the 
severity of a victim’s outcome as a guide in evaluating and 
sentencing perpetrators. Since insurance positively changes the 
severity of the consequences for a victim, I hypothesized that, 
other things being equal, people will recommend lower 
punishments for crimes in which the victim was insured as 
opposed to uninsured.  
Six experiments were conducted to examine this effect. 
Experiment 2.1 provides initial support for the hypothesized 
relationship between the extent to which a victim is insured or 
not and the corresponding severity of punishment. Experiment 
2.2 aims to determine whether people knowingly punish 
perpetrators less severely when victims are insured, by asking 
participants to judge both the insured and uninsured 
conditions simultaneously. Experiment 2.3 extends these 
findings by looking at the role of foreknowledge of the 
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perpetrator. Experiment 2.4 tests whether people would also 
differentiate between insured and uninsured individuals when 
punishing a transgression that did not result in any harm. 
Experiment 2.5 aims to determine whether people would also 
punish perpetrators more mildly when the crime against the 
insured victim was in fact more severe. Finally, Experiment 2.6 
examines the role of possible psychological processes that may 
explain why people are more lenient towards perpetrators 
when the victim happened to be insured as opposed to 




Twenty-nine students (6 male, 23 female) at Tilburg 
University participated in exchange for course credit (Mage = 19, 
SD = 1.40). All participants were asked to read a brief scenario 
concerning the theft of a camera and subsequently were asked 
to determine the severity of punishment the thief deserved. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the insurance or no 
insurance condition. The scenario in the insurance [no 
insurance] condition read as follows:  
 
Tom is an amateurphotographer who decides to purchase 
a new camera. In the store he is asked if  he wants to 
insure the camera against theft. This type of insurance 
guarantees that Tom will receive a new camera in case 
the camera is stolen.  
 
Although Tom doubts whether to buy the insurance, he 
decides [not] to do so. In short, his camera is [not] insured 
against theft. A few days later when Tom is sitting on the 
terrace in the city and wants to leave, he discovers that 





Some time later Tom finds out that a person was arrested 
who confessed stealing and selling the camera. A common 
punishment for such an offence is imposing community 
service. Community service entails doing  compulsory 
social work for several days (8 hours a day). 
 
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to 
make a punishment recommendation by indicating the number 
of days (minimum 1 day, maximum of 20 days) they thought 
the perpetrator should fulfill community service.  
 
Results and discussion 
The results showed that participants recommended less 
severe punishments when the camera was insured (M = 9.20; 
SD = 5.98) as compared to when it was uninsured (M = 13.93; 
SD = 5.42), t (27) = 2.23, p = .04, d = 0.83. These findings 
confirm the initial prediction that people would punish the 
same transgression differently as a function of whether the 
victim was insured or not. These results can be interpreted in 
two ways. One possibility is that people recommend more 
severe punishments when stealing an uninsured possession. 
Alternatively, it may be the case that people recommend a 
milder punishment when the victim was insured. An additional 
study was designed to addresses this issue by including a 
baseline condition in the experimental design.    
Additional study. Besides replicating the previous results, 
the purpose of this experiment was to test whether the 
uninsured condition would be punished more severely 
compared to a neutral baseline or whether the insured 
condition would be punished less severely compared with the 
same baseline. The procedure, scenario and dependent 
measure were identical as the one used in the previous 
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experiment except that a baseline condition was added which 
did not mention the possibility of buying insurance. Ninety-
nine individuals at various locations in Tilburg (46 male, 53 
female) volunteered to participate in this study (Mage = 25, SD = 
8.44). Punishment recommendations again varied as a function 
of insurance, F (2, 96) = 5.30, p = .007, η² = .11 thus replicating 
the results of the first experiment. Planned comparisons 
showed that participants again imposed milder punishments 
on a perpetrator who stole an insured camera (M = 7.48; SD = 
4.93) compared to a perpetrator who stole an uninsured 
camera (M = 12.00; SD = 6.30), t (64) = 3.24, p = .002, d = 0.80. 
Likewise, participants recommended a milder punishment on a 
perpetrator who stole an insured camera as compared to 
baseline participants (M = 10.97; SD = 6.37), t (64) = 2.49, p = 
.02, d = 0.61. Punishment recommendations did not vary 
between the uninsured and the baseline condition (t < 1, ns.). 
This pattern shows that compared to the neutral baseline, 
people recommend milder punishments when victims happen 




The above results demonstrate that people differentiate 
between insured and uninsured victims when judging both 
cases separately. Would people still differentiate between both 
victims when evaluating the two cases jointly? Joint evaluations 
allow decision makers to comparatively evaluate multiple 
options while in separate evaluation only one of two options is 
evaluated. Previous research demonstrated preference 
reversals between what people choose in separate versus joint 
evaluation (Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Zhang, 2010). These reversals 
demonstrate that switching from one evaluation mode to the 




given attribute (in our case, stealing an insured versus 
uninsured possession). Importantly, joint evaluations allow us 
to determine whether people believe they should differentiate 
between insured and uninsured victims when sentencing 
perpetrators (for similar reasoning, see Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, 
& Wade-Benzoni, 1998). The present experiment therefore 
manipulated evaluation mode by asking participants to assess 
the appropriate punishment for the theft of an insured as well 
as an uninsured camera. The purpose of this design was to test 
whether, under these comparative conditions, participants 




Seventy-nine students (12 male, 67 female) at Tilburg 
University participated in exchange for course credit (Mage = 19, 
SD = 3.27). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
experimental conditions: separate evaluation – insured victim 
(SE-I), separate evaluation – uninsured victim (SE-U), or joint 
evaluation (JE). The same scenario as in the first experiment 
was used. Hence, the SE conditions constitute replication of 
Experiment 1. In the JE condition, participants were first asked 
to read a scenario in which a perpetrator stole an insured 
camera followed by a scenario in which a different perpetrator 
stole an uninsured camera. Both scenarios were presented on 
the same page. Thus, JE participants were implicitly 
encouraged to compare the two scenarios and were then asked 
to indicate the appropriate punishment for the described 
perpetrators. Order of presenting the two scenarios was 
counterbalanced which did not affect punishment 
recommendations.   
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Results and discussion 
I first compared the punishment recommendations 
between the two separate evaluation conditions (SE-I and SE-
U).  Replicating the findings of Experiment 2.1, an independent 
t-test revealed that participants recommended less severe 
punishment for the perpetrator when the victim was insured 
(M = 9.52; SD = 6.27) than when the victim was uninsured (M = 
12.85; SD = 5.39), t (51) = 2.07, p = .04, d = 0.57.1 For the JE 
condition, however, a paired sample t-test revealed no 
significant difference, t (25) = -1,69, p =.10, d = 0.33, indicating 
that when the two cases were seen together, people punished 
equally stealing an insured (M = 10.73; SD = 6.37) or uninsured 
camera (M = 11.19; SD = 6.25). It is noteworthy to point out 
that only three participants in the JE condition provided 
different ratings for the two perpetrators. All other participants 
(89%; 23 out of 26) recommended an identical punishment for 
the two perpetrators. In sum, when placed in a comparative 
situation, the large majority of participants believe that a 
punishment should not be a function of the victim’s insurance 







                                                          
1 The insured and uninsured conditions in Experiment 2.1 and the separate-conditions in 
Experiment 2.2 constitute exact replications. I therefore aggregated these observations to get a 
more exact estimate of the effect. The results indicate that perpetrators whose victims were 
insured received milder punishments than those whose victims were uninsured (M = 8.56; SD = 
5.67 vs. M = 12.70; SD = 5.76), t (147) = 4.43, p < .001, d = 0.72. Interestingly, while only 8 out of 
75 participants (10.7%) in the insured condition imposed a maximum sentence (20 days), 
significantly more imposed this sentence in the uninsured condition (28.4%; 21 out of 74), χ² 
(1, N = 149) = 7.46, p = .006, φ = .22. This pattern reversed for relatively low punishments. In 
the insured condition, 33 out of 75 participants (44%) imposed a punishment equal or less 
than 5 days while only 15% (11 out of 74) in the uninsured condition imposed these relatively 






Experiment 2.2 demonstrates that the insured victim 
effect disappears when evaluating both cases jointly. Would 
people also recommend equal punishments for perpetrators 
who knowingly stole an insured or uninsured possession 
respectively? The principle of mens rea (Latin for ‘guilty mind’) 
states that ‘the act does not make a person guilty unless the 
mind is guilty’. In essence, this principle states that the 
relevance of a victim’s outcome in sentencing a perpetrator 
depends critically on the level of foreknowledge when causing 
harm. For example, involuntary manslaughter refers to the 
unlawful, but unforeseen, killing of a person while committing a 
crime (e.g., killing a pedestrian, without intent, when running a 
red light) and deserves less punishment than voluntary 
manslaughter (i.e., murder). In our case, the mens rea principle 
states that the relevance of insurance in sentencing may 
depend on whether a perpetrator knew in advance that one’s 
victim was insured or uninsured. That is, knowingly stealing an 
uninsured (as opposed to insured) possession is more 
blameworthy while such a difference is unjustified when the 
perpetrator was unaware of the victim’s insurance status. In 
testing the mens rea principle in the domain of insurance and 
punishment, the next experiment explicitly manipulated 
whether perpetrators knowingly or unknowingly stole an 
insured or uninsured possession.  
 
Method 
Eighty-one students (35 male, 46 female) at Fontys 
University of Applied Sciences participated in exchange for €4,- 
(Mage = 21, SD = 2.39). The current study was part of a set of 
unrelated studies. As in the joint evaluation condition in 
Experiment 2.2, participants were asked to read the two 
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scenarios concerning the theft of an insured or uninsured 
camera and subsequently were asked to assess the appropriate 
punishment each thief deserves. They were randomly assigned 
to one of two experimental conditions in which they were 
either informed that both perpetrators knew their victim’s 
insurance status versus that both perpetrators were unaware 
of the insurance status of their victims. Order of presenting the 
two scenarios was counterbalanced; order did not affect 
punishment recommendations.   
 
Results and discussion 
I first compared participant’s punishment 
recommendations for the two perpetrators who unknowingly 
stole an insured or uninsured camera. A paired sampled t-test 
revealed no difference in punishing both perpetrators (M = 
11.52, SD = 6.17 versus M = 11.50, SD = 6.19), t<1, ns. However, 
the pattern changed when perpetrators knowingly stole an 
insured versus uninsured possession. Knowingly stealing an 
uninsured camera was judged as deserving a harsher 
punishment (M = 12.18, SD = 5.36) than knowingly stealing an 
insured camera (M = 11.35, SD = 5.46), t (38) = 2.36, p = .02, d = 
0.38. Importantly, while almost no participant (5%; 2 out of 42) 
recommended different sentences when unknowingly stealing 
an uninsured or insured possession, significantly more (36%; 
14 out of 39) participants imposed different punishments when 
knowingly stealing an insured or uninsured camera, χ2 (1,81)= 
12.21, p < .001, φ = .15. 
In sum, people indicate that punishments should not be a 
function of a victim’s insurance (or lack of it) when 
perpetrators unknowingly steal insured versus uninsured 
possessions. A large minority, however, does differentiate 
between perpetrators who knowingly steal insured versus 




for a victim indeed justifies more punishment, but only when a 
perpetrator knowingly steals an uninsured versus insured 
possession. This may suggest that the insured victim effect (see 
Experiment 2.1) can be accounted for by participants’ implicit 
belief that perpetrators were aware of the insurance status of 
their victim. In a post experimental test, I therefore asked a 
different group of participants (N = 15) to read either the 
insured or uninsured scenario of our first experiment. 
Subsequently they were asked whether they thought that the 
perpetrator was aware of stealing an insured or uninsured 
camera respectively (yes vs. no). A large majority (93%) 
indicated that they thought the perpetrator was not aware of 
the (lack of) insurance, ruling out that a difference in 




Although the harm caused to an insured individual is 
less severe than the harm caused to an uninsured individual, 
harm is not always a necessary consequence. For example, a 
perpetrator might be caught in the act leaving the potential 
victim unharmed. Such an offense still deserves punishment. 
Would people again differentiate between insured and 
uninsured individuals when harm was potential but not 
realized? Insurance may not only change the severity of actual 
misfortunes, but may also influence thoughts about what could 
have happened. Research within the domain of counterfactual 
thinking indeed suggests that, when proposing a sentence for a 
wrongdoer, people are sensitive for what could have happened 
to a victim (see Miller & McFarland, 1986; Macrae, 1992). In a 
similar vein, I propose that being protected of harm by means 
of insurance alters what could have happened which in turn 
enhances the insured victim effect. Experiment 2.4 addresses 
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this issue by holding constant the outcome of a norm violation 
(i.e., there is a foul but no harm) while only varying a person’s 
vulnerability to the consequences if harm had occurred 
(insured versus uninsured person). In addition, I employed a 
new vignette in order to determine whether the insured victim 
effect will replicate using a different norm violation and 
punishment type. Finally, because I employed a new vignette, I 
again varied the evaluation mode of participants (separate 
versus joint evaluation) in order to examine whether I would 




One hundred and nine students (41 male, 67 female, 1 
unreported) at Fontys University of Applied Sciences 
participated in exchange for €4,- (Mage = 20, SD = 2.68). The 
current study was part of a set of unrelated studies. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
experimental conditions: separate evaluation – insured 
employee (SE-I), separate evaluation – uninsured employee (SE-
U), or joint evaluation (JE). Participants in the separate 
evaluation conditions were asked to read one of the following 
two scenarios. The scenario in the insurance [no insurance] 
condition read as follows: 
 
Joris is a student who works for all kinds of companies on 
a daily basis via an employment agency. He is asked by 
the agency if he wants to buy disability insurance. This 
insurance guarantees that Joris, in case of work related 
injury, will receive specialised rehabilitation that will 
prevent a lasting disability. Although Joris doubts 




decides [not] to do so. In short, Joris is [not] in the 
possession of disability insurance.      
 
Later that day Joris is employed as a window washer for a 
company called WASH & GLASS. After receiving a wooden 
ladder he is instructed to wash numerous windows at 
three meters height. While climbing up the ladder, it turns 
out that the fourth step is rotten and Joris falls down and 
lands on his knee. Joris does not get hurt.  
 
Sometime later Joris learns that the owner of WASH & 
GLASS confessed to the occupational safety authority of 
being negligent in the maintenance of the ladder. 
Meanwhile, the owner replaced the ladder. A common 
punishment for such an offense is to temporarily suspend 
the company’s working permit. This means that during 
this period WASH & GLASS is not permitted to work and 
will lose revenue.   
 
After reading the scenario, participants made their 
punishment recommendation by indicating the number of days 
(a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 20 days) the working 
permit of WASH & GLASS should be suspended. In the JE 
condition, participants were asked to read an insured and 
uninsured scenario (applying to different employees and 
different companies) presented on the same page. Order of 
presenting the two scenarios was again counterbalanced which 
did not have an effect on punishment recommendations.  
  
Results and discussion  
An unexpected gender difference was observed (male 
participants punished the business owner less severe than 
female participants; M =7.05; SD = 5.66 vs. M = 9.91, SD = 5.66), 
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t (107) = 2.55, p = .01, d = 0.50), and in the rest of the analyses I 
controlled for gender.2 I first compared the punishments 
imposed by participants in the two separate evaluation 
conditions (SE-I and SE-U).  An analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) revealed that participants recommended a lower 
punishment when the employee happened to be insured (M = 
8.00; SD = 5.50) as opposed to uninsured (M = 10.37; SD = 
5.53), F (1, 72) = 4.35, p = .04, η² = .05. The pattern in the JE 
condition was different. For the JE condition, a within-subject 
ANCOVA revealed that participants did not differentiate when 
punishing the two business owners. Specifically, participants 
did not impose a milder punishment for a business owner 
employing an insured employee (M = 7.70, SD = 6.10) than the 
one employing an uninsured employee (M = 7.60, SD = 6.15), F 
(1, 31) = 1.30, p = .26. Again a large majority (79%; 26 out of 
33) of participants in joint evaluation reported an identical 
punishment recommendation for the two business owners. 
This pattern of results is very similar to those obtained in 
Experiment 2.2 demonstrating, once again, the impact of 
insurance (or lack of it) on punishment recommendations. 
Although participants believed that the victim’s insurance 
status should not influence their punishment recommendation 
(as inferred from the joint-comparative condition), they 
nevertheless take it into account in their judgment when in a 
separate, non-comparative condition. Importantly, even in the 
absence of actual harm, people still recommend less severe 
punishments for transgressions in which the (potential) victim 




                                                          
2 I checked for gender differences in all other experiments but did not find any gender effect. An 






Experiments 2.2 and 2.4 demonstrated that the insured 
victim effect disappears when comparing both cases jointly. 
Does it imply that people are insensitive to the harm 
component when comparing both cases in joint evaluation? 
This would contradict the widespread belief that a punishment 
should be proportional to the harm caused. Experiment 2.5 
tested the tenet that stealing a possession that is either insured 
or uninsured can be perceived as more or less harmful 
depending on how one assesses harm. For example, compare 
stealing an expensive but insured Mp3 player priced $299 with 
stealing a relatively inexpensive, uninsured Mp3 player priced 
$99. In terms of retail prices, the former theft causes more 
harm than the latter. However, in terms of harm to the victim, 
the second theft causes more harm because the Mp3 player was 
not insured. When are people guided by the insurance status of 
a victim and when by the actual value of the stolen possession 
in sentencing a perpetrator?  
From a legal perspective, the actual value of a stolen 
possession should outweigh the victim’s insurance status. After 
all, insurance only transfers the loss from the victim to the 
insurance company but it surely does not make the total 
consequences of the crime less severe. However, assessing the 
value of any object is inherently a comparative judgment and 
often hard to evaluate in isolation (see Hsee, 1996). The 
purpose of Experiment 2.5 was to test the proposition that 
people in joint versus separate evaluation use a legally relevant 
detail (i.e., the actual value of a stolen possession) differently 
when punishing a crime in which the value of the stolen 
possession is hard to evaluate. In order to make the value hard 
to evaluate, I stated the retail price in a currency of which the 
value was supposedly unfamiliar to our participants (Japanese 
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Yen). More specifically, participants were asked to impose an 
appropriate punishment for a perpetrator who either stole an 
insured camera (priced ¥260.000) or an uninsured camera 
(priced ¥21.000). Even though the actual price is what people 
should consider when evaluating how much punishment a 
perpetrator deserves, this attribute is hard to evaluate. Without 
a reference, most of our participants would not know whether 
a camera priced ¥260.000 is expensive or not. In contrast, the 
insurance status of a victim is relatively easy to evaluate. Most 
people would evaluate a victim’s harm as little when insured 
while large when uninsured. It was therefore predicted that 
people in separate evaluation would punish stealing the 
insured, expensive camera less harsh while the pattern was 
expected to reverse in joint evaluation.  
A second objective of this experiment was to examine a 
person’s affective response to the insured victim. Prior 
research has indicated that less harm is associated with less 
compassion that in turn is associated with less severe 
punishment recommendations (e.g., Nadler & Rose, 2003). 
Given that insurance changes the severity of a victim’s harm, I 
hypothesized that insured victims evoke less compassion than 
uninsured victims which, in turn, is expected to mediate the 
relationship between a victim’s insurance status and 
punishment recommendations.  
 
Method 
One-hundred and one students (55 male, 38 female, 8 
unreported) at various Dutch universities volunteered to 
participate (Mage = 22, SD = 4.67, 8 unreported). Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three experimental 
conditions: separate evaluation – insured & expensive camera 
(SE-Iexp), separate evaluation – uninsured & inexpensive camera 




read a scenario in which a perpetrator stole a digital camera. 
The scenario in the insured-expensive camera [uninsured-
inexpensive camera] condition read as follows: 
 
Tom decides to buy a digital camera prized ¥260.000 
[¥21.000] via the Japanse website of Amazon.com. 
Amazon also provides the possibility to insure the camera 
against theft. This type of insurance gurantees that Tom 
will receive a new camera in case the camera is stolen.  
 
Tom decides [not] to buy the insurance. In short, his 
camera is [not] insured against theft. A few days later 
when Tom is sitting on the terrace in the city and wants to 
leave, he discovers that his camera was stolen. Of course, 
he realizes that he insured [did not insure] the camera. 
 
Some time later Tom finds out that a person is arrested 
who confessed stealing and selling the camera. A common 
punishment for such an offence is imposing community 
service. Community service entails doing  compulsory 
social work for several days (8 hours a day). 
 
In the JE condition, participants were asked to read both 
the insured-expensive and the uninsured-inexpensive scenario 
(applying to different victims and perpetrators). Both scenarios 
were presented on the same page. Order of presenting the two 
scenarios was counterbalanced and did not affect any of the 
dependent variables.  
After reading the scenarios, participants indicated their 
level of compassion with the victim via the following two 
questions, (1) how much compassion one felt for the victim (1 = 
absolutely not, to 7 = absolutely) and (2) how much harm the 
victim suffered (1 = relatively little, to 7 = relatively much). 
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These items were significantly correlated (r = .41, p < .001) and 
averaged into a compassion composite. Finally, participants 
indicated the number of days (a minimum of 1 day and a 
maximum of 20 days) they thought the perpetrator should 
fulfill community service. Participants in the two separate 
evaluation conditions were also asked if they knew the value of 
1 Yen in Euros (1= I don’t have any idea to 4 = Yes, exactly; for a 
similar procedure, see Hsee, 1996). This question was added in 
order to assess whether participants indeed thought the 
Japanese currency was hard to evaluate.    
 
Results and discussion 
 Manipulation check. The mean evaluability score for a 
Japanese Yen was 1.52 (SD = .83) and differed significantly 
from the midpoint (2.5) of the scale t (65) = 9.67, p < .001, 
confirming that the value of the camera was a hard-to-evaluate 
attribute in this experiment.   
Main findings. The main findings are summarized in Table 
2.1. I first compared the two separate evaluation conditions 
(SE-Iexp and SE-Uinexp). A t-test revealed that insured victims 
indeed evoked less compassion than uninsured victims. In 
addition, replicating the insured victim effect, participants 
recommended a milder punishment for stealing an expensive 
but insured camera than an inexpensive but uninsured camera. 
For the JE condition, punishment recommendations reversed. 
Although the insured victim again evoked less compassion than 
uninsured victims, participants nevertheless punished stealing 
the insured but expensive camera more severe than the 
uninsured, inexpensive camera. These results confirm that 
people differentiate between a victim’s harm and the actual 
value of the stolen possession when sentencing perpetrators. 
When the actual value is hard to evaluate independently, 




evaluated comparatively, however, the value of the possession 
becomes the primary factor underlying punishment 
recommendations and the victim’s role is strongly attenuated.  
Exploratory mediation analyses. A mediation analysis was 
applied only to the separate conditions because responses in 
the joint condition are not independent. I found support for a 
mediating role of compassion in the insured victim effect, using 
a series of regression analyses (cf. Baron & Kenny, 1987). 
Specifically, the relationship of the victim’s insurance status 
and punishment recommendation (B = 0.26, t = 2.19, p = .032) 
became non-significant (B = 0.20, t = 1.64, p = .11) when 
compassion with the victim was added in the analysis (B = 0.22, 
t = 1.89, p = .07). When evaluating both cases separately, 
insured victims seem to evoke a less powerful emotional 
response that, in turn, affects punishment recommendations. 
 
Table 2.1 
Experiment 2.5: Effect of Possession Type and Evaluation Mode on Compassion 
with the Victim and Punishment Recommendation. 
 
                                      
             Camera Victim  
  





 M (SD) M (SD) t   p          d 
 
Separate Evaluation 
    
Compassion 3.43 (1.43) 4.22 (1.38) 2.37 .02      0.58 
Punishment 9.38 (5.73) 12.68 (6.84) 2.19 .03      0.53 
     
 
Joint Evaluation 
    
Compassion   3.58 (1.34) 4.47 (1.26) 2.55 .02      0.50 
Punishment 12.03 (6.20) 10.60 (6.60) 2.92 .007   0.73 
 
     
Note: The punishment decision was assessed on a scale ranging from a 1 day sentence to a 20 
day sentence. To assess a participant’s compassion with the victim, a 2-item 7-point scale was 
used, with higher score indicating more compassion.  





This experiment was designed to explore other potential 
mediators for the insured victim effect, in addition to the role of 
compassion. For example, compassion is related to anger and 
research shows that anger is related to punishment decisions 
(Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 
2009; Sunstein, 2005). Moreover, transgressions that evoke 
more compassion are, in general, judged to be more serious or 
unethical and vice versa. Thus, although Experiment 2.5 
showed that compassion may partly account for our findings, it 
remains unclear whether the effect is driven solely by 
compassion or whether it is driven by a change in anger or 
ethical judgment. In addition, the mediating role of compassion 
is not sufficient to account for all our findings, because the 
insured victim effect was observed even in the absence of 
actual harm (see Experiment 2.4). Given that harm and 
compassion are intimately related, the absence of harm in 
Experiment 2.4 would presumably have resulted in similar 
degrees of compassion in both experimental conditions. Yet, we 
still observed the insured victim effect. The objective of the 
final experiment was therefore to explore other potential 
explanations that could account for the insured victim effect 
namely, a change in anger, ethical judgment or compassion. I 
employed a new vignette and, as in previous experiments, 
evaluation mode (separate vs. joint) was manipulated.   
 
Method 
One hundred and thirteen students (14 male, 99 female) 
at Tilburg University participated in exchange for course credit 
(Mage = 20, SD = 3.83). The current study was part of a set of 




comprehension question.3 Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three experimental conditions: separate 
evaluation – insured car owner (SE-I), separate evaluation – 
uninsured car owner (SE-U), or joint evaluation (JE). 
Participants in the separate evaluation conditions were asked 
to read one of the following two scenarios. The scenario in the 
insurance [no insurance] condition read as follows: 
 
Tim recently received his driver’s license. While leaving a 
parking space he hits another parked car. When stepping 
out, he notices that his car is undamaged. However, the 
other car is worse off. The side surface is dented and the 
paint is damaged. Tim looks around and realizes that no 
one has seen the accident. Tim doubts what to do. He 
decides to leave. 
 
Sometime later, Tim is arrested. A local resident saw the 
accident happening from her home. The police report 
showed that in the meantime the damaged car has 
already been repaired. The insurance company fully paid 
for the repair costs. The owner was well insured against 
such damages [The owner fully paid for the repair costs. 
The owner was not insured against such damages]. 
 
After reading the scenario, I asked a participant the 
following set of items: 
Punishment recommendation. First, a participant indicated 
a general punishment recommendation by stating how much 
punishment Tim deserved (1 = mild, to 7 = severe). Next, 
                                                          
3 Participants in the separate evaluation conditions were asked in a post experimental 
questionnaire to indicate whether the victim in their scenario was insured or uninsured. Four 
participants in the uninsured victim condition indicated erroneously that the victim in their 
scenario was insured. These four participants were discarded from the analysis. Excluding 
these participants did not change the pattern of results in any meaningful way.    
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participants made a specific punishment recommendation by 
indicating the number of days (a minimum of 1 day and a 
maximum of 20 days) they thought Tim should fulfill 
community service.  
Compassion. To assess a participant’s compassion with the 
victim, they were asked (1) how much compassion one felt for 
the victim (1 = no compassion, to 7 = much compassion) and (2) 
how much harm the victim suffered (1 = no harm, to 7 = much 
harm). The items were significantly correlated (r = .53, p < 
.001) and averaged into a compassion composite. 
Ethical judgment of the situation. Participants were told 
that, “Some offenses are more severe than others. Please 
indicate the severity of Tim’s offense” (1 = not at all severe, 7 = 
very severe). In addition, participants were told that, “Some 
offenses are more unethical than others. Please indicate how 
unethical Tim’s offense is” (1 = not at all unethical, 7 = very 
unethical). These items were significantly correlated (r = .51, p 
< .001) and averaged into an ethical judgment composite. 
Feelings of anger. Four items were employed to assess a 
participant’s anger toward the situation (α = .95). Specifically, 
participants were asked to indicate how angry the 
transgression of Tim made them feel; how mad the 
transgression of Tim made them feel; how angry they were at 
Tim; and how mad they were at Tim (1= not at all, 7 = very).  
Different punishment. Finally, participants in the separate 
evaluation conditions were asked whether they would punish 
the perpetrator differently had the victim been uninsured (in 
the insured victim condition) or insured (in the uninsured 
victim condition) by indicating: Yes, a more severe punishment; 
Yes, a less severe punishment; No, the same punishment. In the 
JE condition, participants were asked to read an insured and 





Results and discussion 
Punishment recommendations. The main findings are 
summarized in Table 2.2. I first compared the two separate 
evaluation conditions and found that participants 
recommended milder punishments when the victim was 
insured. This was true for both the general- and specific 
punishment recommendation. However, when explicitly asked 
whether they would change their punishment had the victim 
been uninsured (in the insured condition) or insured (in the 
uninsured condition), a large majority of participants (81%; 
65/80) indicated that they would not change their sentence.  
This supports the idea that people believe that insurance 
should not affect punishments, yet they nonetheless impose 
milder punishments when victims are insured. This conclusion 
is even stronger supported by examining the recommendations 
of participants in the joint condition. When imposing a specific 
punishment (i.e., community service) for both cases jointly, 
people again did not differentiate between an insured or 
uninsured victim. In fact, a large majority (85%; 28 out of 33) 
imposed identical number of days of community service for 
both perpetrators, irrespective of the insurance status of their 
victims. For the general punishment scale, a paired-sample t-
test indicated a significant statistical difference when 
participants compared both cases jointly (i.e., the insured case 
deserved a less severe punishment than the uninsured case). 
However, this difference was driven by a small minority of 
participants. While a large majority (76%; 24 out of 33) 
provided identical punishment responses for both cases, only 8 
out of 33 participants (24%) indicated that both perpetrators 
should be punished differently.4 Overall, these results confirm 
                                                          
4 In testing whether the observed difference in the joint evaluation condition was statistically 
different from the difference in the separate evaluation condition, I ran a modified t-test. The 
results confirmed that the difference in the joint condition was smaller than the observed 
difference in the separate evaluation condition, t (106) = 2.51, p < .01 (one-tailed). 
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that the large majority of people believe that a punishment 
should not be a function of the victim’s insurance, yet people 
nonetheless impose milder punishments when victims are 
insured when evaluating both cases separately.  
Compassion. Analyzing first the two separate evaluation 
conditions, the findings of Experiment 2.5 were replicated 
showing that insured victims evoked less compassion than 
uninsured ones. A similar pattern, yet even stronger, was 
observed in the joint condition. Overall, people seem to feel less 
compassion for insured victims, irrespective of the evaluation 
mode of a person.  
Ethical judgment. When comparing the separate 
evaluation conditions, the results indicate that a victim’s 
insurance status changes how people evaluate the 
transgression. Participants judged the act to be less unethical 
when the victim was insured as opposed to uninsured. A 
similar pattern emerged when comparing the responses in the 
joint evaluation condition. A paired-sample t-test revealed that 
the transgression in the insured case was perceived to be less 
serious than the uninsured case. However, a large majority of 
participants in the joint condition (79%; 26 out of 33); 
provided identical ethicality ratings for both cases, while only 7 
out of 33 participants (21%) rated both cases different.5 
Overall, these results indicate that the majority of participants 
seem to believe that the presence of an insured victim should 
not change the evaluation of the act, yet people nonetheless 
judge the act to be less severe when evaluating both cases 
separately. These results support the contention that a victim’s 
outcome influences the evaluation of the act, even when the 
outcome is logically irrelevant. Evidently, when evaluating both 
                                                          
5 In testing whether the observed difference in the joint evaluation condition was statistically 
different from the difference in the separate evaluation condition, I ran a modified t-test. The 
results confirmed that the difference in the joint condition was smaller than the observed 




cases separately, a transgression that resulted in less harm is 
perceived to be a smaller foul than an identical transgression 
that happened to result in more harm (see also Gino et al., 2009 
for the outcome bias in ethical judgments).  
Anger. When comparing the two separate evaluation 
conditions, I find no evidence for the idea that insured victims 
arouse less anger than uninsured victims. In joint evaluation 
however, an insured victim did evoke a less angry response as 
compared to when the victim was uninsured.     
Exploratory mediation analyses. As in Experiment 2.5, the 
analysis was applied only in the separate conditions. As initial 
step, I first inspected the correlations between the potential 
mediators. Ethical judgments were significantly correlated with 
compassion with the victim (r = .41, p < .001) and the anger 
that the situation evoked (r = .54, p < .001) while anger, in turn, 
was significantly correlated with compassion with the victim (r 
= .38, p = .001). Overall, these results indicate that the potential 
mediators are strongly related, yet not fully correlated, 
suggesting that compassion, anger, and ethical judgment may 
differentially explain why people become more lenient towards 
perpetrators when victims are insured. To examine the 
mediating role of compassion, anger, and ethical judgment in 
explaining the insured victim effect, I ran a bootstrap analysis 
as recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2008) with 5000 
bootstrapped samples. 6  The results suggest that the insured 
victim effect was mediated by the change in ethical judgment 
and not by the change in compassion or anger. Specifically, 
when I entered compassion, anger, and ethical judgment in the 
same bootstrapped model simultaneously, the ethical judgment 
was the only significant mediator, B = 0.27, Z = 2.04, p = .04, 
with a 95% confidence interval excluding zero (0.0577 to 
                                                          
6 I report only the results of the mediation analyses on the general punishment 
recommendation since the results on the specific recommendation are identical in meaning. 
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0.6024). Compassion and anger did not show a significant 
pattern, compassion B = -0.03, Z = -.35, p = .73; anger B = 0.08, Z 
= 1.08, p = .28, with both a 95% confidence interval including 
zero. These results suggest that the presence of an insured 
victim seems to attenuate the perceived severity of the crime 
that, in turn, affects punishment recommendations. 
 
Table 2.2 
Experiment 2.6: Effect of Victim Type and Evaluation Mode on Punishment 
Recommendations, Compassion with the Victim, Ethicality Judgments and 
Feelings of Anger. 
 
  
 Car of the Victim 
  
 insured  uninsured    
 M (SD) M (SD)      t    p         d 
 
     
Separate Evaluation     
Punishment General 3.55 (1.18) 4.53 (1.38)   3.72 .001   0.86 
Punishment Specific 6.18 (5.73) 8.83 (6.84)   2.25 .03      0.52 
Compassion 4.45 (1.07) 5.31 (1.19)   3.30 .002   0.75 
Ethical Judgment 3.38 (1.19) 3.99 (0.86)   2.55 .02      0.60 
Anger 3.21 (1.31) 3.78 (1.52)   1.76 .08      0.40 
     
     
 
Joint Evaluation 
    
Punishment General 4.67 (0.78) 4.94 (0.90)   2.73 .01      0.49 
Punishment Specific 7.06 (4.21) 7.67 (4.71)   1.50 .14      0.27 
Compassion 3.97 (1.24) 5.91 (0.87)   8.28 .001   1.47 
Ethical Judgment 4.00 (1.15) 4.15 (1.27)   2.73 .01      0.51 
Anger 4.60 (1.42) 4.95 (1.48)   3.38 .001   0.65 
 
 
Note: The punishment general measure is assessed on one-item 7-point scale, with higher 
scores indicating more punishment. The punishment specific score is assessed on a scale 
ranging from a 1 day sentence to a 20 day sentence. To assess compassion with the victim, a 2-
item 7-point scale is used, with higher score indicating more compassion with the victim. The 
ethical judgment item is assessed on a 2-item 7-point scale, with higher scores indicating that 
the transgression is perceived as more unethical. Finally, to assess feelings of anger, a 4-item 7-







In this article I highlight a hidden cost of insurance: 
People recommend milder punishments for perpetrators when 
the victim happened to be insured, although people believe that 
a sentence should not depend on whether the victim was 
insured or not. The results of six experiments (using a variety 
of different transgressions and punishments) established the 
existence of an “insured victim” effect and suggest that people 
inadvertently differentiate between insured and uninsured 
victims when evaluating moral transgressions.  
Experiment 2.1 demonstrated that people would punish 
identical transgressions less severely when victims are insured 
as opposed to uninsured. Experiment 2.2 found that the effect 
disappeared when participants had to determine jointly the 
sentence for both the insured and uninsured case. Experiment 
2.3 extended these findings by ruling out that the effect is 
driven by the perpetrator’s foreknowledge. Experiment 2.4 
demonstrated that when harm was possible but not realized, 
people still punish crimes less severely when the (potential) 
victim was insured. Experiment 2.5 showed that punishment 
recommendations can even be more lenient for crimes that are 
in fact more serious but in which the victim was insured. 
Finally, in Experiment 2.6, I explored via correlational and 
mediational analyses, the extent to which a number of potential 
psychological mechanisms could account for the insured victim 
effect namely (1) how people evaluate the severity of the 
transgression, (2) one’s compassion with the victim and (3) the 
anger that the situation evoked. The results suggest that the 
insured victim effect is associated with a change in how people 
evaluate the severity of the transgression and not by a change 
in compassion or anger. 
                         The insured victim effect 
43 
 
The present research contributes to a recent stream of 
research investigating how legally irrelevant characteristics of 
victims enter judgments of ethical behavior For example, 
Nordgren and McDonnell (2001) recently showed that 
increasing the number of people victimized by a crime in turn 
decreases punishment recommendations. The authors explain 
their findings by the identifiable victim effect (e.g., Kogut & 
Ritov, 2005) following which unidentifiable victims evoke less 
sympathy and less severe punishments than identified victims 
(Kogut, 2011). I present evidence for a similar effect in which 
transferring losses to an unidentified entity (i.e., insurance 
company) results in less severe punishments.   
This work also contributes to a stream of research 
highlighting the negative intra- and interpersonal 
consequences of safety mechanisms. For example, Walker 
(2007) has shown that when overtaking a cyclist, drivers are 
less cautious (i.e., get closer to the cyclist) when cyclists wear a 
helmet (analogous to insurance) than when they do not. Thus 
the safety measure may ironically attract hazard. The present 
studies supplement this line of research by showing that, other 
things being equal, insurance may lower the threshold for 
committing a crime due to possible reduced punishment.    
The present results are seemingly incompatible with 
rationalist theories of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969) 
because of the punishment differences between the separate 
and joint evaluation modes. These reversals can be elucidated 
by further examining the vital difference between joint and 
separate evaluation mode. Specifically, in the joint mode, which 
is comparative in nature, it is evident that the severity of the 
crime is identical (e.g., the same camera was stolen in both 
cases). The fact that participants in this case impose exactly the 
same punishment implies that they consider the crime severity 




harm is irrelevant in this case). However, in the separate 
condition, in which there is no reference point for comparison, 
the insured victim evoked less compassion and participants 
evaluated the transgression to be less severe resulting in lower 
punishment recommendations. In other words, participants’ 
norm (as inferred from the joint condition) is that 
compensating a victim’s harm by means of insurance should 
not have an effect on the size of punishment. Yet, contrary to 
that belief, and supposedly being unaware of it, participants in 
the separate condition are swayed by the lack of suffering by 
the insured victim and, contrary to their standards, inflict a 
lower punishment in the insured case.  
The results reported in the present article were all 
obtained from a population of laypersons. These findings 
should therefore be tested on other populations (especially 
professional judges and juries), although research indicates 
that professional judges or juries are no different than 
laypersons in being prone to biases (Vidmar, 2011; Rachlinski, 
Johnson, Wistrich, & Guthrie, 2009; Landsman & Rakos, 1994). 
Scenario studies obviously have their limitations, yet I maintain 
that for revealing punishment recommendations, this method 
is very useful. Note that legal cases are almost always 
presented in the form of scenarios to judges and juries. 
Notwithstanding, I do not undermine the importance of future 
research in addressing these issues by using more diverse 
samples and research methods.  
On a final note, the foregoing results are important not 
only from a theoretical but also from an applied perspective. 
Legal systems are often rooted in the premise that punishments 
should be proportional to the harm caused. However, the 
harmfulness of an unethical act is evaluated differently when 
crimes are judged jointly or separately. In separate evaluation, 
people seem to focus on the consequences of the victims while 
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in joint evaluation people are primarily guided by the harmful 
consequences of a crime in absolute terms (independent of the 
consequences to victims). Hence, in separate evaluation, people 
may be vulnerable to the insured victim effect or other biases. 
It is important to realize that in real life situations, judges or 
jury members are usually in a separate rather than in a joint 
condition. Legal policy makers should be aware that people in 
separate evaluation are more easily swayed by legally 
irrelevant details (such as the insurance status of victims) 











Chapter 3  
The hidden cost of insurance 
 
Abstract: To trust is to risk and a common solution to mitigate 
risk is to buy insurance. Employing the trust game (e.g., Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), I demonstrate that buying 
insurance against the breach of trust may have a hidden cost: 
Trustees are more likely to act opportunistically and betray 
trust when the other party chooses to be insured against the 
risk of betrayal. Supposedly, trustees are less likely to 
cooperate when trustors decide to be insured because by 
choosing insurance, trustors implicitly signal that they expect 
the trustee to behave opportunistically, paradoxically 
encouraging trustees not to cooperate. These results shed new 
light on the potential weakness of financial safeguards that are 
intended to minimize the risky nature of trusting: The 
presumed safeguard against the risk of betrayal may, under 
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ocial exchange is typically characterized by risk, 
especially when the different parties have to trust each 
other. In particular, there are many situations in which 
cooperation would be the most mutually beneficial outcome for 
both sides yet there are incentives for the trusted party to 
defect. For example, a buyer on eBay pays a seller in advance, 
only to receive the good in the future. The seller is often a 
stranger who has an incentive to behave opportunistically by 
sending nothing because not cooperating is rewarding. 
Standard economic theory assumes that agents are exclusively 
motivated by their own self-interest (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2002) and models of trust (in particular game theoretic ones) 
therefore suggest that individuals should be cautious (e.g., 
Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985).  
A possible solution to mitigate problems of trust and the 
corresponding risk is to buy insurance that will compensate 
losses if trustees decide to act opportunistically. For example, 
contracts often specify whether one party decided to be 
insured in the event the exchange partner does not meet its 
obligations. Yet, how would an exchange partner respond when 
reading that the other party decided to obtain insurance? 
Following a signaling perspective on trust and reciprocity 
(McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 2003; Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001), 
I propose that protecting oneself against the possibility of 
betrayal is perceived as an act of distrust. By insuring 
themselves, trustors implicitly signal that they expect the other 
side to behave opportunistically. Importantly, the results 
suggest that trustees reciprocate these negative expectations 
by reducing their willingness to cooperate. The presumed 
remedy against the risk of betrayal may thus paradoxically 
increase the probability of betrayal. I report four experiments 
that investigate when and why an insured trustor affects a 
trustee’s willingness to cooperate.  
S 
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The paper is organized as follows. I start by examining the 
pertinent literature on how trustors’ actions may conceal 
implicit signals that affect the willingness of trustees to 
cooperate. Second, I discuss how other control mechanisms 
intended to minimize risk decrease interpersonal cooperation 
in trust situations. Experimental tests of the conjectures are 
described in the third section. The last section provides a 
broader discussion of the results and their implications.    
   
Trust in signs 
 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998) conceptualize 
trust as “a psychological state compromising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395). The “trust game” 
(Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Dasgupta, 1988; Wrightsman, 
1966) is a common experimental paradigm for studying two 
person interactions. A typical trust game, as depicted in Figure 
3.1 in the appendix (p. 72), is an anonymous one-shot game in 
which people in the role of player 1 have to decide between 
two possible actions: if they do not trust the other person (and 
move left), the game ends, leaving both parties with a moderate 
reward. If they do trust (and move right), player 2 
subsequently has to choose between two possible options: 
reciprocating (“honoring”) trust  by moving right, leaving both 
persons better off than when player 1 did not trust, or 
betraying trust (moving left), which maximizes personal gain 
for player 2 at the expense of player 1. Note that the depicted 
figure contains the words no trust, trust, betray trust, and 







In other versions of the trust game, the decision of player 
1 can be how much out of an endowment he or she sends, and 
similarly, for player 2 it can be a decision how much to send 
back. Importantly, the underlying dimensions of trusting and 
honoring remain the same in these slightly different games. 
Although not compatible with standard economic theory, 
research consistently finds that the majority of people trust, 
and correspondingly the majority in turn reciprocate trust, also 
in anonymous one-shot games (as opposed to repeated trust 
games) in which reputational concerns are not at stake (e.g., 
Berg et al., 1995).  
A question that remains open concerns the conditions 
that may enhance and explain trustees’ cooperative behavior 
leading them to reciprocate trust and sacrifice personal gain. A 
recent approach in explaining reciprocity emphasizes the role 
of signaling intentions and expectations in achieving a 
cooperative outcome (e.g., McCabe et al., 2003). This approach 
conceives the social interaction, as reflected in the trust game, 
as a conversational exchange. An act of trust (i.e., forgoing a 
sure though smaller outcome) is assumed to implicitly inform a 
trustee that the trustor wants to cooperate and arrive at a 
mutually beneficial outcome. Trustees are said to understand 
these concealed intentions and feel obliged to reciprocate. One 
consequence of this approach is that different trustees who face 
identical choice options may differ in their willingness to 
cooperate when the ‘trusting act’ signals different expectations. 
For example, McCabe et al. (2003) found that trustees were 
more likely to honor trust when trust was voluntary (in the 
sense that the trustor also had the opportunity not to trust) as 
opposed to involuntary. In explaining this difference, the 
authors argued that a voluntary act of trust has the ability to 
signal that a trustor wants to arrive at the mutually beneficial 
outcome. An involuntary act of trust is unable to signal such 
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intentions since the trustor had no choice but to cooperate. 
Thus, although trustees may face objectively identical choice 
options, they nevertheless may ascribe different intentions to 
the trustor depending on the signals conveyed by the trustee.  
Research by Pillutla, Malhotra, and Murnigham (2003) 
provides further support for the idea that players interpret the 
behavior of other players as signals of their intentions. They 
found that reciprocation followed rather categorical 
perceptions of trust. In their experiment, trustors decided how 
much out of an endowment to send to the trustee. The amount 
sent tripled on its way and a trustee subsequently decided how 
much (if any) to return to the trustor. The results showed that 
sending anything less than the entire endowment was 
perceived as a sign of distrust. As a consequence, trustees 
reciprocated large acts of trust while small acts of trust made 
reciprocation unlikely. Taken together, these studies suggest 
that trustees are conditionally kind to trustors. That is, any sign 
of distrust may be sufficient to undermine a trustee’s voluntary 
willingness to act in the interest of the trustor. In the next 
section I review relevant literature on how risk controlling 
devices that are indented to minimize risk may undermine 
cooperation by signaling distrust.       
 
When controlling a trustee undermines cooperation 
by signaling distrust 
 
Like insurance, legal control mechanisms (e.g., contracts 
or penalties) have become a common practice to minimize the 
risky nature of social exchange situations. Unlike insurance, 
however, the detrimental effects of these control mechanisms 
on trust and reciprocity have been well documented (e.g., 




Rockenbach, 2004; Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006; 
Falk & Kosfeld, 2004).  
When two parties lack a history of cooperation, a contract 
that specifies the agreement and the sanctions imposed on 
those who breach the agreement makes sense. Yet, specifying 
the agreement ‘in writing’ has an undesirable side effect: It 
signals a lack of trust. After all, if party A trusts party B, there is 
no need to constrain the actions of party B by threatening with 
sanctions. Indeed, a number of experiments indicate that 
threatening to penalize trustees when performances fall short 
may harm the relationship. For example, in testing the effects of 
imposing a fine on cooperation, Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) 
carried out a trust game in which a trustor decided how much 
out of an endowment to send to a trustee who, in turn, decided 
how much to return from a larger endowment. Yet, before the 
trustee decided how much to return, a trustor could choose to 
penalize the trustee if the return would not exceed a certain 
amount. Of course, the trustor could also refrain from imposing 
the fine. Since returning any amount is costly for a trustee, 
standard economic theory predicts that a trustee will return 
nothing. Threatening to fine trustees, by making it costly to 
defect, is therefore optimal. However, if there are trustees who 
are motivated to perform in the interest of the trustor, the 
threat may actually hinder cooperation. The results of Fehr and 
Rockenbach indeed showed that not imposing a fine rendered a 
much higher return as compared to when a fine was imposed. 
When a fine was imposed, trustees retuned on average just 
enough to avoid the fine, but not more, leaving a trustor 
relatively empty handed.  
More support for the idea that control mechanisms may 
undermine cooperation by signaling distrust comes from a set 
of studies by Falk and Kosfeld (2006). Their studies examined 
whether demanding a minimum performance level of trustees 
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(e.g., labor contracts that specify a minimum output) would 
undermine a trustee’s voluntary performance level. In a 
principal-agent game, agents were endowed with a given 
amount of money and had to decide how much (if any) to share 
with a principal. However, before an agent made his decision, 
principals could first choose to restrict (i.e., control) the choice 
set of an agent by demanding a minimum payoff. Although the 
minimum payoff was fixed and rather low, it would guarantee a 
principal with a certain outcome. Since sharing is costly to an 
agent, standard economic theory predicts that an agent would 
share nothing. Principals are therefore better off restricting the 
choice set of an agent rather than to trust the agent to perform 
in the interest of the principal. The results showed that 
trusting, rather than controlling an agent, rendered a higher 
return. In explaining these results, Falk and Kosfeld claimed 
and demonstrated that agents view demanding a minimum 
payoff as a signal of distrust, which in turn undermined 
voluntary contributions.  
These results suggest that introducing control devices 
that are intended to minimize the risky nature of social 
interactions may, in fact, hinder cooperation by signaling 
distrust. I employ a similar reasoning in explaining why 
insurance may hinder cooperation by signaling distrust.  
 
The insured trustor 
 
In essence, an insurance policy is a safety instrument by 
which a third party (the insurance company) undertakes to 
compensate an insured party for losses that may be incurred by 
misfortunes (for a comprehensive review of behavioral 
economics research on insurance, see Kunreuther, Pauly, & 
McMorrow, 2013). Insurance thus changes the severity of an 




individual in the event that a specific hazard occurs. 
Importantly, while contracts and insurance policies are both 
designed to minimize risk, they do so in very different ways. 
Contracts and fines are designed to mandate cooperation by 
making it unattractive to behave opportunistically and not to 
cooperate. These mechanisms thus minimize risk by increasing 
the likelihood of cooperation because it becomes costly for the 
other party not to cooperate. An insurance policy, on the other 
hand, does not restrict the actions of interaction partners. Yet, 
it minimizes risk by transferring the risk of loss from an 
insured individual to the insurance company. How would 
trustees respond to trustors who chose to be insured against 
the consequences of a trustee’s most opportunistic act?  
Because defection is rewarding, trustees may act 
opportunistically leaving a trustor with less than what she 
would gain had she not chosen to trust. Trustors who anticipate 
a trustee to act selfish are therefore better off insuring 
themselves than not. However, following a signaling 
perspective, I conjecture that by insuring oneself, the trustor 
(implicitly) signals distrust, expecting the trustee to behave 
opportunistically. Given that trustees respond negatively to 
signs of distrust (e.g., Falk & Kosfeld, 2004; Fehr & Rockenbach, 
2004), the insurance policy may do more harm than good. If 
there are trustees who are motivated to act in the interest of 
the trustor, the insurance policy may actually discourage 
cooperation. Thus, under certain circumstances, the presumed 
remedy against the risk of betrayal may in fact increase the 
probability of betrayal.  
The following experiments were designed to test how 
trustees perceive and respond to trustors who are insured 
against the consequences of betrayal in one-shot trust games. 
Experiment 3.1 provides initial support for the hypothesized 
relationship between a trustor who is insured (as opposed to 
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uninsured) and the predicted decrease in trustees’ readiness to 
cooperate. Experiment 3.2 extends these findings by ruling out 
that the observed decrease can be accounted for by a mere 
change in the payoff structure for a trustor who is insured as 
opposed to uninsured. Experiment 3.3 examined whether it is 
being insured that drives the effect (independent of whether 
the trustor chose to be insured or not) or whether choosing 
insurance over no insurance explains our findings. Evidently, 
cooperation decreased but only when trustors were insured by 
choice and not by chance. Finally, Experiment 3.4 extends these 
findings by showing that (1) trustors understand that choosing 
insurance hinders cooperation, yet (2) they nonetheless prefer 
to be insured as opposed to uninsured when presented with 
the choice.     
Experiment 3.1 
 
Participants in the role of player 2 were told that player 1 
chose to be insured or not. Being insured in our experimental 
game meant that if player 2 would decide to defect, player 1 
would only lose a moderate amount of money (instead of a 
larger sum when uninsured). Given that choosing to be insured 
implicitly signals distrust, I predicted a significant decrease in 
cooperation by player 2 when they learned that player 1 chose 
to be insured.  
 
Method 
One hundred and fifty seven students (41 male, 116 
female) at Tilburg University participated in exchange for 
course credit or €8,- (Mage = 21, SD = 2.51). The current study 
was part of a set of unrelated studies and the study was run in 
two non-consecutive weeks.1 Participants were randomly 
                                                          
1 I initially planned to run the study in one week, yet I only ran (approximately) 80 participants. 




assigned to one of two conditions (Trustor: Insured vs. 
Uninsured). Upon arrival in the lab, participants were seated in 
separate cubicles, ostensibly to preserve anonymity. They 
received instructions on the computer screen explaining that 
they would make a number of financial choices together with 
another participant. Subsequently, using a chart as in Figure 3.2 
(see appendix, p. 73), they received instructions regarding the 
rules of the two-person interaction. Specifically, they were told 
that player 1 first had to decide whether to choose left or right. 
If player 1 chose left, the game would end and each player 
would receive €5,-. If, however, player 1 chose right, player 2 
was given the option to choose between moving left or right. 
Before player 2 could make his decision, player 1 still had the 
option to insure herself. Insurance implied that player 1 would 
receive €4,- if player 2 decided to defect. When uninsured, 
player 1 would receive €2,- if player 2 would defect. All other 
outcomes were kept identical. They were further explicitly 
informed that of all couples that participated in the experiment 
that week, 10 would be randomly chosen and paid according to 
the decisions they made. Participants read the instructions 
without any time pressure and were given the opportunity to 
ask clarification questions at any time.  
Subsequently, participants learned that they were 
assigned the role of player 2 and their counterpart the role of 
player 1 (which, in reality, was a preprogrammed strategy), 
that they would interact via a network computer, and that all 
decisions would be displayed on the computer screen. In 
addition, they were explicitly informed that they would never 
meet or know the identity of their counterparts during or after 
the interaction. After these instructions, participants were 
asked to wait for player 1’s decisions.  
                                                                                                                                   
increase power. Note, that in both Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 I again replicated the same pattern 
of results thus corroborating the results of the present experiment.     
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All participants saw that player 1 chose right (i.e., trust) 
thus leaving the final decision with the participant on how to 
split the larger sum. Yet, before they could make their decision, 
they were informed about player 1’s insurance decision. 
Depending on condition, player 1 either decided to insure 
him/herself or not. After having seen player’s 1 decision, 
participants indicated whether they would split the larger sum 
of money in an equal (i.e., honor trust) or unequal (betray 
trust) manner. Ten participants were randomly chosen by the 
end of the experiment and were paid according to their choice.   
 
Results and discussion     
As predicted, participants were less likely to cooperate 
when trustors chose to be insured as opposed to uninsured. 
Whereas a minority of participants (45% or 36 out of 80) 
decided to split the money equally when trustors were insured, 
significantly more participants favored this option (62% or 48 
out of 77) when trustors were uninsured, χ² (1, N = 157) = 4.74, 
p = .03, φ = .17. These initial results support a signaling 
perspective on trust and reciprocity (e.g., McCabe et al., 2003). 
Choosing insurance over no insurance is conceived to signal 
distrust which, in turn, decreases the willingness of trustees to 
cooperate and act in a pro-social manner. 
Note that by manipulating the insurance choice, I also 
slightly varied the payoffs for player 1. Specifically, although 
defection would endow the participant (in the role of player 2) 
in both conditions with €15,-, this option left player 1 with €4,- 
when insured and €2,- when uninsured. According to models of 
inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Loewenstein, 
Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989), the greater the relative 
difference between one’s own outcome and the outcome of the 
other player, the more aversive the non-cooperative option 




in cooperation could therefore be the reduced inequality rather 
than a change in signaling distrust when the trustor chose to be 
insured. 
The following experiment addressed this issue by 
including baseline conditions that are equivalent in both 
experimental conditions in term of payoffs, without mentioning 
the possibility of insurance. Because ‘outcome based models’, 
like inequality aversion, exclusively focus on payoffs in 
explaining cooperation, these models would therefore predict 
no differences in cooperation rates between baseline- and 
experimental conditions. A signaling perspective, however, 
predicts an interaction in that cooperation will only decrease 
when the trustor chooses to be insured. A second objective of 
Experiment 3.2 was to assess whether the insurance decision 
was indeed perceived as an act of distrust. As mentioned in the 
introduction, I propose that the effect of insurance in 





Two hundred and forty seven students (70 male, 177 
female) at Tilburg University participated in exchange for 
course credit or €8,- (Mage = 20, SD = 3.12). The current 
experiment was part of a set of unrelated studies. The 
procedure was identical to Experiment 3.1, except that in the 
baseline conditions, the insurance option was deleted. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions 
based on a 2 (Game Type: Insurance vs. Baseline)  2 (Worst 
Possible Outcome for Trustor: €2,- vs. €4,-) between-subjects 
design. The game was explained to participants by exposing 
them to Figure 3.2 or 3.3 (see appendix, p 73 and p. 74), 
depending on condition. 
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 Trust perceptions. After being informed about player 1’s 
decisions, participants were asked four-questions concerning 
the other player’s trust. Specifically, they were asked to 
indicate the extent (1 = not at all, 7 = very) they believed that 
(1) player 1 trusted the participant; (2) player 1 expects the 
participant to choose left (reversed coded); (3) the participant 
has the impression that player 1 does not trust (reversed 
coded); (4) player 1 doubts whether the participant’s 
intentions are good (reversed coded). Responses were 
averaged into a ‘trust perception’ scale (α = .80). 
Cooperation. Participants were subsequently asked to 
choose how they wanted to split the larger sum of money (i.e., 
equal split versus unequal split). Ten (randomly chosen) 
participants were paid by the end of the experiment according 
to their choice.  
 
Results and discussion  
Trust perceptions. The results for the trust scale are 
shown in Table 3.1 (top row). A 2 (Game Type) x 2 (Worst 
Possible Outcome) ANOVA on the trust perceptions rating 
revealed a main effect for game type, F(1, 243) = 35.62, p < 
.001, η² = .12 and worst possible outcome, F(1, 243) = 66.04, p 
< .001, η² = .21. These main effects were qualified by a 
significant two-way interaction, F(1, 243) = 55.60, p < .001, η² = 
.19. Trustors who chose to be insured were seen as less 
trusting than those who chose to be uninsured, t (118) = 9.33, p 
< .001, d = 1.70. Comparing the two baseline conditions (where 
insurance was not an option), trustors were not seen as more 
or less trusting, t < 1. This pattern of results strongly suggest 
that the act of choosing insurance over no insurance signals 
distrust. Next I examine whether trustees reciprocate these 




Cooperation. The percentages of participants who 
reciprocated trust are portrayed in the second column of Table 
3.1. Cooperation among participants again decreased when 
trustors chose to be insured (50% or 30 out of 60) as opposed 
to uninsured (74% or 46 out of 62), χ² (1, N = 120) = 10.47, p = 
.001, φ = .30. To test whether this decrease is influenced by the 
act of choosing insurance (and not by differential payoffs), a 
logistic regression analysis was performed, using a 2 (Game 
Type) x 2 (Worst Possible Outcome) design. There was a main 
effect for worst possible outcome, χ²(1, N = 247) = 1.29, p = 
.002, φ = .07, but no main effect for game type, χ²(1, N = 247) = 
.23, p = .59, φ = .03. Importantly, the predicted interaction 
between game type and worst possible outcome was observed, 
χ² (1, N = 247) = 3.83, p = .05, φ = .12. Results show that 
cooperation rates only decreased under the condition in which 
the trustors chose to be insured as compared to baseline 
participants, χ²(1, N = 125) = 5.65, p = .02, φ = .21. Participants 
did not differ in their cooperation rates when trustors chose to 
be uninsured as compared to baseline participants, χ²< 1. These 
results replicate the results of Experiment 3.1 and further 
corroborate the main hypothesis.  
Earnings. When analyzing the earnings, I compared the 
experimental conditions with the corresponding baseline 
conditions because these conditions were identical in payoff 
structure. On average, participants earned more for themselves 
(Table 3.1, 3rd row) when the trustor decided to be insured as 
opposed to participants in the baseline insured condition, t 
(123) = 2.41, p = .02, d = 0.43. Participants earned neither more 
nor less when a trustor chose to be uninsured as compared to 
participants in the baseline uninsured condition, t < 1. 
Likewise, as portrayed in the final column of Table 3.1, being 
insured would have earned trustors significantly less as 
compared to trustors in the baseline insured condition. 
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Uninsured trustors would not have earned differently from 
trustors in the baseline, t < 1.2 Although standard economic 
theory assumes that trustors are better off insuring themselves 
than not, our result suggest that choosing insurance may in fact 
leave the trustor relatively worse off. Overall, these results 
suggest that choosing insurance over no insurance hinders 
cooperation by decreasing a trustee’s willingness to cooperate 
and act in the interest of the trustor. These results cannot be 
explained by theoretical accounts that focus exclusively on a 
comparison of outcomes in explaining trustees’ decisions.  
Mediation analysis. Earlier it was proposed that insurance 
leads to distrust which in turn reduces the likelihood for 
cooperation.  To test this conjecture, I ran a bootstrap analysis 
(Preacher and Hayes, 2008) with 5000 bootstrapped samples. 
Consistent with our interpretation, when trust perceptions 
were entered in the bootstrapped model, it comprised a 
significant mediator of the effect of insurance on cooperation, B 
= 0.35, Z = 2.48, p = .01.  
The results so far demonstrate that cooperation in the 
trust game is contingent on the signals of (dis)trust that 
trustees perceive in the choice to be insured. Yet, being insured 
may affect trustees in another distinct way: Because the trustor 
is insured, the trustee may be less reluctant not to cooperate 
realizing that the trustor will be compensated by the insurance. 
Following this account, trustees might decrease their 
willingness to cooperate  because the trustor is insured, 
irrespective of whether he/she deliberately decides to be 
insured or not. Experiment 3.3 was designed to disentangle 
whether being insured per-se decreases cooperation 
(independent of the trustor’s insurance decision), or whether 
the trustor’s intentional choice for insurance determines the 
trustee’s behavior. I address this issue by including two 
                                                          




additional conditions to the experimental design in which the 
trustor is insured or not by chance (as opposed to by choice). 
As a final objective, I also measured whether choosing 
insurance over no insurance would influence interpersonal 




Trust Perceptions, Percentage of Cooperative Choices, and the Payoffs of the 








   
  Uninsured 
   
   Baseline    
   insured 
   
   Baseline    
 uninsured 





  5.93 (0.95) 
 
 5.66 (0.82) 
 
 5.75 (0.80) 
Cooperation 50% (30/60)   78% (47/60)  71% (46/65)  74% (46/62) 
Payoff pp  12.50 (2.52)   11.08 (2.08)  11.46 (2.29)  11.29 (2.21) 
Payoff trustor  
 
7.00 (3.03)   8.27 (3.32)  8.25 (2.75)  8.06 (3.45) 
Note: Trust perceptions are assessed on a 4-item 7-point scale, with higher scores indicating 
more perceived trust. Cooperation is the percentage (frequency within parentheses) of 
participants that honor the trust given by player 1. A higher payoff for the participant indicates 
a lower willingness to equally split the larger sum of money with the trustor (a preprogrammed 





Two hundred seventy four students (66 male, 208 female; 
Mage = 20, SD = 2.68) at Tilburg University participated in 
exchange for course credit or €8, -. The current study was part 
of a set of unrelated studies. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions based on a 2 (Trustor 
Insured vs. Uninsured)  2 (Insurance by Choice vs. by Chance) 
between-subjects design. The procedure was identical to the 
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one employed in Experiment 3.1, except that, depending on 
condition, player 1 was insured or uninsured by deliberate 
choice or by a computer programmed random device. 
Participants were instructed about the nature of the two-
person interaction by using a copy of Figure 3.2 or 3.4 
(depending on condition; see appendix, p 73 and p. 75). After 
being informed about player 1’s decisions, participants 
responded to the four-item trust scale from Experiment 3.2 (α 
= .87). Participants subsequently indicated how they wanted to 
split the money (i.e., equal split versus unequal split). Finally, 
participants were asked to indicate whether player 1 made a 
positive first impression (1 = not at all, 7 = very). Ten randomly 
chosen participants were paid by the end of the experiment 
according to their choice.   
 
Results and discussion     
Trust perceptions. The results for the trust scale are 
shown in Table 3.2 (top row). A 2 (Trustor Insured vs. 
Uninsured) x 2 (Insurance by Choice vs. by Chance) ANOVA on 
the trust perception rating revealed a main effect for whether 
the trustor was insured or not, F(1,270) = 94.54, p < .001, η² = 
.26 and whether the (un)insurance decision was by choice or 
chance, F (1,270) = 52.85, p < .001, η² = .16. Importantly, these 
main effects were qualified by a significant two-way 
interaction, F(1,270) = 92.65, p < .001, η² = .26. Replicating the 
findings of Experiment 3.2, trustors who were insured by 
choice were perceived as less trusting than trustors who were 
uninsured by choice, t (146) = 12.56, p < .001, d = 2.06. 
Trustors who were insured by chance were not seen as more or 
less trusting as compared to trustors who were uninsured by 
chance, t < 1.  Once again, these results strongly suggest that it 




distrust. Would trustees again reciprocate these negative 
expectations by decreasing their willingness to cooperate? 
Cooperation. Replicating the results of Experiment 3.1 and 
3.2, participants cooperated less when trustors chose to be 
insured as opposed to being uninsured,  χ²(1, N = 148) = 6.15, p 
= .01, φ = .20. In testing whether this difference is influenced by 
the act of choosing insurance or being insured, a logistic 
regression was performed, using a 2 (Trustor Insured vs. 
Uninsured) x 2 (Insurance by Choice vs. by Chance) design. 
There was a main effect for whether a trustor was (un)insured 
by choice or chance, χ² (1, N = 274) = 1.02, p = .005, φ = .06, but 
no main effect for whether the trustor was insured or not, χ² (1, 
N = 274) = .30, p = .44, φ = .03. More importantly, the predicted 
interaction was obtained, χ² (1, N = 274) = 4.89, p = .03, φ = .06. 
Cooperation frequencies did not differ when trustors were 
uninsured by choice or by chance, χ² < 1. However, as 
predicted, cooperation rates only decreased when trustors 
were insured by choice as compared to being insured by 
chance, χ²(1, N = 136) = 7.94, p = .005, φ = .24. 
Earnings. On average, participants earned more for 
themselves (Table 3.2, 3rd row) when the trustor decided to be 
insured by choice as opposed to when the trustor was insured 
by chance, t (134) = 2.88, p = .005, d = 0.48.  Participants 
earnings were the same regardless of whether a trustor was 
uninsured by choice or chance, t < 1. Likewise, as portrayed in 
the fourth column of Table 3.2, being insured by choice again 
left the trustor relatively empty handed as compared to 
trustors who were insured by chance. Trustors who were 
uninsured by choice would not have earned more or less 
compared to trustors who were uninsured by chance, t < 1. In 
sum, trustees do not maximize personal gain per-se when 
trustors are insured ruling out the explanation that the mere 
presence of an insured other would facilitate a non-cooperative 
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choice. Consistent with the signaling perspective, however, it is 
rather the act of choosing to insure oneself that is negatively 
reciprocated.  
Mediation analysis. To examine whether I would replicate 
that the observed decrease in cooperation can be accounted for 
by the change in trust perceptions, I again ran a bootstrap 
analysis with 5000 bootstrapped samples. Replicating the 
findings of Experiment 2, the results suggest that the effect is 
again (partially at least) mediated by the change in perceived 
trust, B = 0.23, Z = 1.78, p = .04 (one-tailed).  
Interpersonal judgment. Finally, the results for the ‘first 
impression’ scale are shown in the last row of Table 3.2. 
Trustors who were insured by choice made a less positive first 
impression than trustors who were insured by chance, t (134) 
= 5.03, p < .001, d = 1.18. Trustors who were uninsured by 
choice as compared to by chance, were not perceived more or 
less positively, t < 1. These results suggest that choosing 
insurance over no insurance not only hinders interpersonal 



















Trust Perceptions, Percentage of Cooperative Choices, the Payoffs of the 






   Insured  
  (Choice) 
   
  Uninsured  
   (Choice) 
   
   Insured   
  (Chance)    
 
   
  Uninsured    
  (Chance) 





  5.83 (0.95) 
 
 5.53 (0.79) 
 
 5.54 (0.84) 
Cooperation 49% (37/73)   69% (52/75)  73% (46/63)  67% (42/63) 
Payoff pp  12.53 (2.52)   11.53 (2.32)  11.35 (2.24)  11.67 (2.38) 
Payoff trustor  6.96 (3.02)   7.55 (3.71)  8.38 (2.68)  7.67 (1.37) 
Judgments 3.84 (1.50)   4.79 (1.73)  5.02 (1.18)  4.67 (1.37) 
 
Note: Trust perceptions are assessed on a 4-item 7-point scale, with higher scores indicating 
more perceived trust. Cooperation is the percentage (frequency within parentheses) of players 
2 that honor the trust given by player 1. A higher payoff for the participant (player 2) indicates 
a lower willingness to equally split the larger sum of money. Note that the trustor was a 
preprogrammed player in our experimental design. Interpersonal judgments are assessed on a 




The previous experiments demonstrate that trustees are 
less inclined to cooperate when trustors are insured by choice. 
The final experiment was designed to explore whether people 
in the role of trustor would (1) realize that that a trustee is 
more likely to act opportunistically when a trustor chooses to 
be insured, and (2) whether they would actually choose to be 
insured or not when given the choice.  
 
Method  
Eighty-two students (22 male, 60 female; Mage = 21, SD = 
3.51) at Tilburg University participated in exchange for course 
credit or €8, -. The procedure was identical to the one 
employed in Experiment 3.1, except that participants were now 
asked to take the role of player 1 (trustor) instead of player 2. 
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They were instructed about the nature of the two-person 
interaction by using a copy of Figure 3.2 (see appendix, p. 73). 
After being instructed, participants were first asked to choose 
either left (i.e., trust) or right (distrust). Those who chose to 
trust were subsequently asked (1) whether they wanted to be 
insured or not and (2) to indicate their belief in how being 
insured may affect the choice of player 2. Specifically, they were 
asked: “Is player 2 more likely to choose left when you decide 
to be insured or uninsured?” Order of presenting the insurance 
choice and the belief question was counterbalanced. 
Participants subsequently learned that player 2 (a 
preprogrammed player) chose to equally split the larger sum. 
At the end of the experiment, 10 participants were randomly 
picked and paid according to their choice.   
 
Results and discussion  
Insurance beliefs. Of all participants, 27 (33%) chose not 
to trust, leaving a total of 55 participants (67%) for further 
analysis. Of these 55 participants, a large majority (82% or 45 
out of 55) believed that player 2 is less likely to cooperate 
when choosing to be insured as opposed to uninsured, χ² (1, N 
= 55) = 22.27, p < .001, φ = .64. This belief was slightly stronger 
when it was assessed after having made one’s insurance choice 
first (93% or 26 out of 28). When this belief was assessed 
before making the insurance choice, 70% (19 out of 27) thought 
that player 2 is less likely to cooperate when choosing to be 
insured, χ² (1, N = 55) = 4.67, p < .03, φ = .29.  
Insurance decision. Of the 55 participants, 42 (76%) chose 
to be insured as opposed to uninsured, χ² (1, N = 55) = 15.29, p 
< .001, φ = .53. There was no significant order effect, χ² (1, N = 
55) = 2.29, p = .13, φ = .12. Specifically, 19 participants chose to 




85% (23 out of 27) decided to be insured when the insurance 
choice came second.  
In sum, although our previous results demonstrate that 
trustees respond negatively to trustors who are insured by 
choice, the results of this experiment suggest that (1) although 
a large majority of participants may realize that trustees are 
less likely to cooperate when choosing to be insured, (2) they 
nonetheless prefer to be insured against the risk of betrayal 
when given the opportunity. These results are compatible with 
the idea that acts of trust are primarily arise from egocentric 
reasoning while failing to take the trustee’s incentives to defect 
into full consideration (Evan & Krueger, 2011; Malhotra, 2004; 




To trust is to risk and a common solution to mitigate 
problems of risk is to buy insurance. In this article I highlight a 
hidden cost of insurance in situations requiring trust: Trustees 
are less likely to cooperate when a trusting party chooses to be 
insured against the risk of betrayal. Employing the trust game 
(e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Dasgupta, 1988), the results of four 
experiments established the existence of the effect and 
provided support for a signaling perspective on trust and 
reciprocity: By insuring oneself, a trustor implicitly signals that 
she expects the trustee to behave opportunistically. Trustees, in 
turn, reciprocate these negative expectations by decreasing 
their willingness to cooperate, leaving the insured trustor 
relatively empty handed. Experiment 3.1 showed that trustees 
indeed become less inclined to cooperate when a trustor chose 
to be insured against a trustee’s most opportunistic act. 
Experiment 3.2 extended these findings by ruling out that the 
observed decrease in cooperation can be accounted for by a 
                                                                      The hidden cost of insurance 
69 
 
mere change in the payoff structure for trustors who are 
insured. Moreover, Experiment 3.3 demonstrated that trustees 
only became less willing to cooperate when the trustor was 
insured by choice and not by chance. In other words, it is the 
deliberate choice of insurance (or refraining from it) that is 
interpreted by the trustee as a signal. Overall, these results are 
compatible with the idea that protecting oneself (by choice) 
against the possibility of betrayal is perceived as an act of 
distrust. Indeed, meditational analyses of both Experiment 3.2 
and 3.3 further supports the assertion that choosing insurance 
provides a signal that the trustor expects the trustee to act 
opportunistically which, in turn, decreases a trustee’s 
willingness to cooperate. Finally, Experiment 3.4 showed that 
(1) although trustors realize that choosing to be insured may 
decrease a trustee’s willingness to cooperate (2) they 
nonetheless choose to be insured as opposed to uninsured 
when given the opportunity. In sum, although standard 
economic theory assumes that trustors are better off insuring 
themselves than not, our results suggest that choosing 
insurance over no insurance will eventually leave the insured 
trustor relatively worse off. 
The present investigation contributes to a stream of 
research investigating how control mechanisms (e.g., contracts 
or sanctions) that are designed to control risk, interfere with 
developing a trusting relationship. For example, as discussed in 
the introduction, Falk and Kosfeld (2004) showed that the 
choice to control a trustee by demanding a minimum 
performance level (e.g., binding contracts in an employer-
employee relationship) is perceived as a sign of distrust which, 
in turn, undermines a trustee’s motivation to act in the interest 
of the trustor. In addition, Malhotra and Murnigham (2002) 
showed similar effects: Proposing a binding contract to 




beneficial relationship. The current findings represent an 
important extension of these results. First, although both 
contracts and insurance policies are designed to minimize risk, 
they do so in very different ways. Insurance policies minimize 
risk by transferring losses while contracts minimize risk by 
making it unattractive for the trustee not to cooperate. I thus 
provide evidence for the aversive consequences of safeguards 
on cooperation, yet with a very different safety mechanism. 
Second, I provide evidence that the hidden cost of insurance on 
cooperation is driven by the same process that can explain why 
people become reluctant to cooperate with a person who 
demands a contract. Choosing to be insured also seems to 
signal distrust, encouraging trustees not to cooperate.  
Our work provides further insight  into a stream of 
research focusing on understanding the intra- and 
interpersonal consequences of safety mechanisms (Van de 
Calseyde, Keren, & Zeelenberg, 2013c; Van Wolferen, Inbar, & 
Zeelenberg, 2013; Tykocinski, 2008, 2013). For example, 
Walker (2007) has shown that when overtaking a cyclist, 
drivers are less cautious when cyclists wear a helmet than 
when they do not. Thus the safety measure of wearing a helmet 
may ironically attract hazard. Similarly, the present studies 
demonstrate that being insured against the risk of betrayal may 
paradoxically increase the probability of betrayal. 
Being insured may affect trustees in at least two distinct 
ways: (1) Because the trustor is insured, a trustee may be less 
reluctant not to cooperate realizing that the trustor will be 
compensated by the insurance, or (2) Choosing to be insured 
signals distrust, which trustees reciprocate by decreasing one’s 
willingness to cooperate. The results of Experiment 3.3 are 
compatible with the second perspective because we only 
observed a decrease in cooperation rates when the trustor 
chose to be insured as opposed to when the trustor was insured 
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by a random device. The first perspective would have predicted 
no differences on trustees’ unwillingness to cooperate.  
In terms of theory, the standard economic model (based 
on value maximization) assumes that the utility of an action 
exclusively depends on its consequences. Only the intrinsic 
properties of the outcomes are assumed to drive behavior 
(McCabe et al., 2003). Yet, I provide evidence that people are 
also sensitive for the intentions behind an action. This idea is 
supported by a considerable body of evidence indicating that 
the attribution of intentions matters in explaining fair- and 
unfair behavior (e.g., Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 1999; 
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Malhotra & Murnighan, 
2002; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; McCabe et al., 2003). This is of 
great importance because it highlights that the principle of 
value maximization fails to explain why people engage in 
mutually beneficial, yet risky interactions.                     
On a final note, the foregoing results are important not 
only from a theoretical but also from a practical perspective. 
The use of insurance is both prevalent and pervasive. In many 
organizations, insurance has become a standardized solution to 
solve problems of risk. An insurance policy makes it possible 
for a risk-averse party to engage in a (potentially) beneficial 
relationship by minimizing the risky nature of the exchange. 
However, cooperation can also be established by relying on 
more efficient and less costly mechanisms like trust and 
reciprocity. Indeed, individuals in high-trust societies spend 
less to protect themselves from being exploited in transactions 
(Knack & Keefer, 1997). Yet, for trust and reciprocity to work, 
risk is needed since reciprocity feeds on the risk that the 
trustor is willing to take (e.g., McCabe et al., 2003). As a 
consequence, mechanisms like insurance that minimize the 
risky nature of trust taking may in fact hinder cooperation 
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Figure 3.2. Modified trust game in which a trustor has the option to be 








Figure 3.3. Simple trust game with €4,- or €2,- (depending on condition) as 
worst possible outcome for trustors serving as baseline conditions for the 
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Figure 3.4. Modified trust game in which a random device determines 















Chapter 4  
Decision time as information 
 
Abstract: Any decision can be characterized by the time with 
which it is made and the decisions of others are no exception. 
Following a signaling perspective, I demonstrate in a variety of 
social interactions that people derive meaning from the time 
that others need in reaching a decision. Specifically, the 
findings reveal that the decision time of others is perceived as 
indicative of the degree of doubt that the decision makers 
experienced in reaching a decision. These perceptions of doubt, 
in turn, reliably affected people’s preferences like with whom 
to collaborate and negotiate, even when the collaboration 
would yield a normatively inferior outcome. These results are 
incompatible with the assumption that the chosen alternative 
will be solely determined by the relevant outcomes. I portray a 
model that incorporates others’ decision time as a component 
of the choice process. Implications for how choices are affected 






This chapter is based on: Van de Calseyde, P.P.F.M., Keren, G., & Zeelenberg, M. (2013a). 
Decision time as information in judgment and choice. Invited revision. Organizational Behavior 




ecisions are intimately related to various aspects of 
time (e.g., Ariely & Zakay, 2001). Decisions take time 
to make and implement, have consequences occurring 
at different moments in time, and often change over the course 
of time. Much research has therefore been concerned with 
understanding how time affects people’s decisions.  
It is important to distinguish between two different facets 
in which time and choices (or decisions more generally) 
interact. One concerns decision time, the time available or 
needed for making a decision, which may strongly effect the 
manner by which a decision is reached and the corresponding 
outcome (e.g., Benson & Beach, 1996; Ordóñez & Benson, 1997; 
Zakay, 1993). While time pressure may indeed impair the 
decision process, there is evidence suggesting that under time 
constraint, decision makers adjust by switching to simpler 
strategies (e.g., Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993; Weenig & 
Maarleveld, 2002). Another line of research in this context 
concerns evaluation in retrospect of decisions made in haste or 
under time pressure, indicating that people regret their choices 
more when having a limited amount of time to choose between 
a set of options (e.g., Inbar, Botti, & Hanko, 2011). 
The second facet in which time and choices interact 
concerns decisions about time. The classical question in this 
context concerns intertemporal choice: Extensive research 
suggests that, other things being equal, people have a tendency 
to prefer immediate rewards over larger, delayed ones, 
affecting people’s health and wealth (e.g., Ainslie, 1991; Keren 
& Roelofsma, 1995; Loewenstein, 1988; Thaler, 1981). Two 
major theoretical approaches to time preferences are 
discounted utility theory (Loewenstein, 1992) and construal 
level theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998).  
The present research is related to the first facet namely 
decision time and investigates an aspect of time in choice that, 
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surprisingly, received little attention in the relevant literature. 
Most of the research of interest looked at decision time and its 
effects on the decision process from the decision maker’s point 
of view. In the current article I take a different perspective and 
examine how the time that others need to reach decisions 
affects a person’s choice in interdependent situations. 
Specifically, people are often sensitized to the time that others 
need in reaching a decision as it may provide important cues 
about the other, for instance the degree of doubt the person 
experienced while making the decision. I propose that in many 
social interactions, these perceptions of doubt may  have strong 
implications for people’s subsequent choices, sometimes even 
resulting in people choosing normatively inferior options. For 
example, imagine having had job interviews at company A and 
company B where both interviews went well. The position at 
company A offers an annual salary of $40.000, while that at 
company B offers $41.000. Suppose it is customary that a 
company decides whether to hire an applicant or not within 
five days following the interview. Company A immediately 
decides to offer you the job. Company B takes five days to 
decide to offer you the job. Which offer would you accept? 
Following the principle of value maximization, the answer 
should be simple: You take the job at company B, with the 
highest annual salary. Following a signaling perspective, 
however, I propose that different decision speeds are perceived 
as reflecting different degrees of doubt on the side of the 
companies. Specifically, company A’s decision speed suggests 
solid confidence in hiring you while B’s speed suggests 
hesitation. Given that people are sensitized to the degree of 
doubt that others express in interdependent situations (e.g., 
Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Fehr & Rockenbach ,2003; Pillutla, 




inclined to accept the position at company B and choose the 
position at company A despite its lower salary offer.  
A key element in our reasoning is that decreasing the 
difference in decision times between parties should diminish 
the informational value of the signal. After all, similar decision 
times imply similar degrees of doubt. As a consequence, when 
both companies reach their hiring decision after say five days, a 
person is expected to maximize on outcomes and choose the 
better paying position at company B. Such a result would not 
only show that identical decisions by others (i.e., both decide to 
hire the applicant for the job) may shift preferences depending 
on how much time others needed in reaching this decision. It 
would also indicate that people perceive the decision times of 
others as a cue of the confidence or doubt the decision maker 
experienced while making the decision. This is important in 
interdependent decision situations as it shows that people are 
not only influenced by the outcomes of the interaction (i.e., 
decision outcome), but also by how they come about (i.e., the 
decision process).  
 
Decision time as signal of doubt 
 
Some prior evidence exists to support the intuition that 
people perceive the time that people need in reaching a 
decision as reflecting this person’s doubt. For instance, 
studying individual choice, Van de Ven, Gilovich and Zeelenberg 
(2010) induced people to delay their decisions. They found that 
when people delay a choice, it leads them to feel doubt with 
respect to the normative option under consideration. As a 
consequence, following delay, people chose the normative 
option less often. Thus via self-perception, people infer 
extended decision time as a signal that they evidently doubt the 
option under consideration.  
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Critcher, Inbar and Pizarro (2013) examined similar 
processes in evaluating the decisions of others. They studied 
whether the time with which a person decided to act morally 
would influence people’s evaluations of this person. In one of 
their experiments, participants were instructed to read a 
scenario in which two men, independently, found a cash filled 
wallet on a parking lot. The first person immediately decided to 
return the wallet to a nearby store while the second person 
similarly decided to return the wallet, yet after a delay. 
Participants were subsequently asked to evaluate the moral 
character of these men. Although both decided to return the 
wallet (i.e., the outcome is the same), the delayed choice person 
was perceived as less honest than the person who immediately 
returned it to the nearby store. In addition, the results showed 
that the effect was mediated by perceptions of doubt. Delaying 
one’s decision to return the wallet was perceived by 
participants as an indication that the person doubted whether 
to keep it or not, which negatively affected the evaluations of 
his character.  
More support for the idea that people perceive decision 
time of others as reflecting doubt comes from a set of studies 
by Galinsky, Seiden, Kim and Medvec (2002). In one of their 
studies, negotiators in the role of a buyer were significantly less 
satisfied with the outcome of the negotiation when their first 
offer was immediately accepted by the seller. This was even 
true when the objective outcome of those whose offer was 
immediately accepted was better than those whose offer was 
not immediately accepted. Supposedly, a seller who accepts the 
offer without hesitation implicitly reveals that his minimum 
reservation price was lower. Buyers who realize this, are likely 
to experience counterfactual thoughts about how they could 
have done better, lowering one’s satisfaction with the 




Overall, these results suggest that people are not only 
responsive to the decision outcome but also attend to how 
others reach their decisions. Evidently, people interpret the 
time others need to respond to a situation as the degree of 
doubt (or lack of it) the person experienced while making the 
decision. Whether decision time is indeed a reliable signal and 
whether inferences from decision time are valid are both 
normative questions that are beyond the scope of the present 
article. Similarly, I refrain from any statement regarding 
whether the agent is or is not aware of the signaling value of 
her decision time. In other words, the hypothesis is purely 
descriptive demonstrating a strong link between decision time 
and the corresponding inferences people derive from this type 
of information. 
 
The present research 
 
In the present article, I test in a series of interdependent 
situations (social interactions in which individuals share and 
exchange resources in order to obtain mutually beneficial 
outcomes) what information may be inferred from decision 
speeds of others and how people use it in choosing between 
multiple options. A similar experimental methodology is 
employed in all the following studies (except the last one, 
which is a field study). In each experiment, participants read a 
scenario (or are engaged in an interaction) with two other 
agents, A and B, who made identical decisions (e.g., both 
decided to hire the participant for a job), yet they reached their 
decisions at varying decision speeds (e.g., A decides 
immediately to hire the participant versus B who decides after 
five days to hire the participant). In addition, the outcome 
associated with agent B always dominated the corresponding 
outcome associated with agent A. It is hypothesized that 
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delayed decisions by others, as opposed to immediate 
decisions, are perceived as a sign that the actor is hesitant in 
reaching the decision. Because of the presumed doubts implied 
by delayed decisions, people are expected to be discouraged to 
choose the hesitant agent (B) as an interaction partner, even 
though such a choice is associated with a normatively superior 
outcome. The first study contains three initial experiments 
offering different demonstrations of how decision speed affects 
interpersonal choices.  
 
Experiments 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 
 
Experiment 4.1  
One hundred forty eight students at Fontys University of 
Applied Sciences in Tilburg participated in a set of unrelated 
studies in exchange for €5. Participants were allocated to one 
of two conditions and accordingly read one of two scenarios in 
which they received job offers from two companies. In one 
scenario (identical decision speeds condition) both offers were 
received after five days. In the other scenario (differential 
decision speeds condition), one offer came much faster (almost 
immediately) than the other (5 days delay). This latter 
condition read as follows:  
 
Imagine having job interviews at two different 
companies: Company A and Company B. The position at 
company A offers an annual salary of €40.000. The 
position at company B offers an annual salary of 
€41.000. The interview at both companies went equally 
well. 
 
It is customary that a company takes a hiring decision 




decides to offer you the job. Company B decides to offer 
you the job after 5 days. 
 
In the identical decision speeds condition, both 
companies reached their hiring decision after 5 days. After 
reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate the 
company they would choose to work for.  
The results are shown in Table 4.1. While most 
participants preferred the higher paying position at company B 
when both companies decided after five days, most participants 
preferred the lower paying position at company A when this 
was offered immediately (in the differential decision speed 
condition, χ² (1, N = 148) = 52.25, p < .001, φ = .60. These initial 
findings support the main conjecture that people are sensitized 
to the time that others need in reaching a decision.  
 
Table 4.1 
Proportion (Actual Numbers in Parentheses) of Participants Choosing 
Company A (Annual salary €40.000) or Company B (Annual Salary €41.000) 
in the Different Decision Time Conditions, Experiments 4.1. 
 
  
                             Decision Time 
 
 
 A immediate 
B after 5 days 
A after 5 days 
B after 5 days 
   
Company A (€40.000) 67%  (52) 10%   (6) 
Company B (€41.000) 33%  (26) 90% (64) 
 
 
Note: Preference for company A or company B is the percentage of participants (frequency 










Experiment 4.2 constitutes a conceptual replication of 
Experiment 4.1 using a different scenario. In addition, note that 
the outcome variable in Experiment 4.1 (annual salary) can 
change over time. People may infer from an immediate hiring 
decision that their annual salary will rise faster in the near 
future. As such, people may strategically prefer the lower 
paying position in anticipation that a large salary raise will 
soon follow. Hence, Experiment 4.2 employs an attribute that is 
not dynamic (the size of a room in m²) in order to test whether 
people would again be sensitive to the decision speeds of 
multiple parties.    
Fifty-one Tilburg University students participated in 
exchange for course credit. The current study was part of a set 
of unrelated studies. Participants read a scenario about 
screening interviews at two dormitories (house A and house B, 
respectively). The scenario in in the differential speed 
condition read as follows: 
Imagine that you want to rent a room in a dormitory and 
you have an interview at two different houses, A and B. 
Each house has three residents who have to decide 
whether they want you as their new roommate. The 
room in house A has a surface of 25 m² while the room’s 
surface in house B is 28 m². The rent for both rooms is 
identical.  
 
After an interview it is customary that the residents 
decide within 24 hours whether to accept you as their 
new roommate. The residents of house A immediately 
decide to offer you the room. The residents of house B 





In the identical decision speed condition, residents of 
both houses reached their decision after 24 hours. After 
reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate which 
room they were going to rent. 
The results are shown in Table 4.2. They show that most 
participants preferred to rent the more spacious room in house 
B when these were offered at the same time. However, when 
the residents of house A immediately reached their decision, 
the majority preferred to rent the less spacious room in house 
A. This choice reversal was significant, χ² (1, N = 51) = 17.07, p 
< .001, φ = .58.  In sum, Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 both suggest 
that people are sensitive to (1) the difference in outcomes 
between the two choice options and, importantly, (2) the time 
that both agents needed to arrive at their decisions.  
 
Table 4.2 
Proportion (Actual Numbers in Parentheses) of Participants Choosing House A 
(Room Size 25 m²) or House B (Room Size 28 m²) in the Different Decision 
Time Conditions, Experiments 4.2. 
 
  
                            Decision Time 
 
 
      A immediate 
B after 24 hours 
A after 24 hours 
B after 24 hours 
   
Room A (25 m²) 58%  (15)   4% (1) 
Room B (28 m²) 42%  (11)  96%(24) 
______________________________________________________           
 
Note: Preference for house A or House B is the percentage of participants (frequency within 










In our previous experiments, participants observed the 
decisions of two parties and were subsequently asked to make 
a choice that would affect their outcome (i.e., their annual 
salary or their room’s surface). Experiment 4.3 was designed to 
extend these findings in situations in which the decisions of 
others would not affect the outcome of participants (i.e., the 
participant is a neutral bystander). 
Fifty-eight members of the general public were recruited 
near the campus of Tilburg University and volunteered to 
participate. They were asked to imagine two homeowners (Bob 
and Tim) who intended to sell their house. The differential 
speed condition scenario, in which Bob was faster in accepting 
the offer, read as follows:  
 
Imagine two homeowners: Bob and Tim, who do not 
know each other. Both homeowners want to sell their 
house. Bob hopes to receive around €200 000 for his 
house and Tim also hopes to receive around €200 000 
for his house. Both owners received an offer. 
 
After receiving an offer it is customary that a 
homeowner decides within 5 days to either decline or 
accept the offer. Bob received an offer of €193 000 and 
immediately decides to accept it. Tim received an offer 
of €196 000 and decides to accept the offer after 5 days. 
 
In the identical decision speed condition both 
homeowners reached their decision after five days. After 
reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate which 






The results showed that the majority of participants (22 
out of 28 or 79%) indicated that Tim would be most satisfied 
with the sell (i.e., the homeowner who accepted the highest 
offer) when both decided after five days to accept their 
respective offer. However, when Bob immediately accepted his 
relatively low offer, the majority of participants judged Bob (16 
out of 30 or 53%) to be the most satisfied seller, despite the 
fact that he received much less for his house. This reversal is 
significant, χ² (1, N = 58) = 7.52, p = .005, φ = .36.  
The perceived satisfaction of a seller is thus not only 
determined by the outcome of the sell, but also by the decision 
speed of the seller. Importantly, in line with the previous 
findings, people seem to derive information from the decision 
speeds of others, even when they are not actively involved in 
the situation. Overall, these three initial experiments provide 
preliminary evidence that people are not only responsive to a 
difference in outcomes but also how different parties arrived at 
their decisions. Moreover, as shown in Experiment 4.1 and 4.2, 
people seem to be even willing to sacrifice superior outcomes 
in favor of a party who brings an inferior outcome, yet who 
decided immediately. 
 
Experiments 4.4 & 4.5 
 
Experiment 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate that people respond 
positively to those who decide first. These results corroborate 
the main hypothesis that people derive information from 
others’ decision times. Yet, a somewhat different explanation 
could be that these choices are guided by a simpler decision 
rule namely “first come first served”. Applying this rule to 
Experiment 4.1, people may have preferred ‘quick’ company A 
over ‘delayed’ company B because company A came first. This 
rule does not necessitate any complex attribution of intentions 
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(like I propose) in explaining why people prefer company A 
over B. The following two experiments (4.4 and 4.5) were 
designed to test these opposing explanations by including a 
condition in which target A is again faster than target B, yet 
only slightly faster. For example, imagine (Experiment 4.1) that 
company A decides after four days to offer the job to the 
participant and company B after five. Irrespective of the 
difference in decision speeds, a ‘first come first served’ 
perspective would predict that company A (who again reached 
their decision first) should be preferred over company B. Yet, a 
signalling perspective would predict differently since now the 
informational value of the difference in decision speeds has 
diminished. People are therefore predicted to prefer the higher 
paying position at company B. While testing between these two 
accounts, Experiments 4.4 and 4.5 also serve as replications for 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. 
 
Experiment 4.4   
Seventy-eight students at Tilburg University participated 
in exchange for course credit. The current study was part of a 
set of unrelated studies. The same experimental conditions as 
in Experiment 4.1 were used, except that an extra condition 
was added in which the difference in decision speed between 
both companies was small. Specifically, in this extra condition, 
participants were told that company A (with the lower annual 
salary) reached a decision after four days and company B (with 
the higher annual salary) reached their decision after five days.  
The results are presented in Table 4.3. As can been seen, 
in the large difference condition (first column - immediate vs. 5 
days), a large majority of participants preferred to accept the 
lower offer of company A (€40.000), yet this pattern is not 
maintained when the difference in decision speeds between 




columns. Compatible with a ‘decision time as information’ 
perspective (and not a ‘first come first served’ account), 
participants were more likely to accept the job at company A in 
the large difference (immediate/5 days) condition than in the 
4/5 days condition, χ² (1, N = 52) = 7.88, p = .005, φ = .39. 
Following the same line of reasoning, participants were more 
likely to work for company A in the 4/5 days condition than the 
5/5 condition, χ² (1, N = 52) = 4.13, p = .04, φ = .28.  
This overall pattern between all conditions (i.e., 
decreasing the difference in decision speeds, in turn, increases 
the attractiveness of the normatively superior party who 
responded second) cannot be explained by a ‘first come first 
served’ account, but is supported by a ‘decision time as 
information’ perspective. Experiment 4.5 was designed to 
replicate this finding in a different choice context.  
 
Table 4.3 
Proportion (Actual Numbers in Parentheses) of Participants Choosing 
Company A (Annual Salary €40.000) or Company B (Annual Salary €41.000) 
in the Different Decision Time Conditions, Experiments 4.4. 
 
  
                                       Decision Time 
       
      A immediate 
     B after 5 days  
 
  A after 4 days    
  B after 5 days 
 
A after 5 days 
B after 5 days 
    
A (€40.000)          61%  (16)       23%  (6)       4%  (1) 
B (€41.000)          39%  (10)       77% (20)     96% (25) 
 
 
Note: Preference for company A or company B is the percentage of participants (frequency 










One hundred and three students at Fontys University of 
Applied Sciences in Tilburg participated in a set of unrelated 
studies in in exchange for €5. The design was identical to the 
one used in the previous experiment employing the scenario of 
experiment 4.2. In the additional (intermediate) condition, 
participants were informed that the residents of house A (with 
the less spacious room) reached a decision after 22 hours and 
the residents of house B decided after 24 hours.  
The results are presented in Table 4.4. As can been seen 
in the large difference condition (first column - immediate vs. 
24 hours), a large majority of participants preferred to rent the 
smaller room in house A (25 m²), yet this pattern is again not 
maintained when the difference in decision speeds becomes 
small or identical, as can be seen from the last two columns. As 
predicted by a ‘decision time as information’ perspective, 
participants were more likely to rent the smaller room in house 
A in the immediate/24 hours condition than the 22/24 hours 
condition, χ² (1, N = 68) = 11.69, p < .001, φ = .42. In addition, 
participants were more likely to rent a room in house A in the 
22/24 hours condition than the 24/24 condition, χ² (1, N = 69) 
= 6.50, p = .01, φ = .31.  
Both experiments (4.4 and 4.5) suggest that the 
dominating choice option (B) becomes less attractive as the 
decision speed of the ‘inferior’ option increases. These results 
are incompatible with a ‘first come first served account’ but are 
consistent with a ‘decision time as information’ perspective: 
The informational value of the difference in decision speeds 









Proportion (Actual Numbers in Parentheses) of Participants Choosing House A 
(Room Size 25 m²) or House B (Room Size 28 m²) in the Different Decision 
Time Conditions, Experiments 4.5. 
      
  
                                              Decision Time 
 
 
         A immediate 
       B after 24 hours  
  A after 22 hours    
  B after 24 hours 
A after 24 hours 
B after 24 hours 
    
A (25 m²)            65%  (22)        24%   (8)         3%  (1) 
B (28 m²)            35%  (12)        76% (26)      97% (35) 
 
 
Note: Preference for house A or House B is the percentage of participants (frequency within 




Experiment 4.6 provides two extensions: First, I replicate 
the findings in a real choice dilemma. Second, following a 
‘decision time as information’ perspective, it was proposed that 
decision speed signals doubt such that longer decision times 
suggest more hesitation. I therefore measured perceived doubt 
and tested whether this mediated the effect of decision speed 
on choice preferences.  
 
Method 
A total of 149 Tilburg University students (44 male, 105 
female) participated in exchange for a fixed amount of €8 (Mage 
= 21, SD = 2.23). Twenty-one participants were excluded from 
the analysis for participating in a previous, similar experiment 
thus leaving the final sample with 128 observations.1 Including 
                                                          
1 These participants had earlier participated in Experiment 4.8 reported later in this article in 
which they were fully debriefed and informed about the exact nature of the study. 
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these participants in the analyses did not change the results in 
any meaningful way.  
Upon arrival in the lab, participants were seated in 
separate cubicles, ostensibly to ensure anonymity. They 
received instructions on the computer screen explaining that 
they were participating in an anonymous one-shot investment 
game. Participants learned that they were assigned the role of 
trustee while two other participants were assigned the role of 
investor (in reality, these investors were preprogrammed 
players). Participants were subsequently informed that both 
investors, A and B, received a random amount of money from 
the experimenter. Investor A received €4 while investor B 
received €4.50. Each investor had to decide, independently, 
whether to trust the participant by sending her the money or 
keeping the money for herself. When an investor decided to 
trust the money to the participant, the experimenter tripled the 
amount and gave it to the participant who subsequently had to 
decide how much (if any) to return. Thus, if investor A decided 
to send the €4, the participant would receive €12 to divide 
between her and investor A. Similarly, if investor B decided to 
send the €4.50, the participant would receive €13.50 to divide. 
Importantly, the instructions specified that a participant could 
divide money with only one of the investors. Hence, when both 
investors decided to invest, a participant first had to choose 
with whom she wanted to interact (i.e., dividing €12 with 
investor A or €13.50 with investor B). Participants had ample 
time to read the instructions and were given the opportunity to 
ask clarification questions at any time. 
Following these instructions, participants were informed 
that both investors had sixty seconds to decide whether to trust 
their money to the participant or not. Two clocks (one for each 
investor) appeared on the center of the screen, counting from 




choice, her corresponding clock stopped and her choice (give or 
keep) appeared underneath the clock. Meanwhile, the clock of 
the other investor kept counting until she would reach a 
decision (give or keep).  
In this experiment, both investors decided to give the 
money to the participant, yet the time in reaching this decision 
was experimentally varied. In the large difference condition, 
investor A (sending €4) decided after 4 seconds to trust the 
money to the participant while investor B (sending €4.50) 
decided after 28 seconds. In the small difference condition, 
investor A decided after 25 seconds and investor B decided 
after 28 seconds. 
Choice. After seeing that both investors decided to trust 
the money to the participant, a participant first had to choose 
with whom they wanted to interact (i.e., dividing €12 with 
investor A or €13.50 with investor B), which constituted the 
main dependent variable.  
Perceptions of doubt. To assess participants’ perceptions 
of doubt,  participants indicated the extent to which (1) 
investor B had more doubts than investor A and, (2) whether  
investor B was less certain than investor A in deciding to hand 
the money to the participant (1= not at all, 7 = very). These 
items were averaged into a doubt perception composite (r = 
.87, p < .001).  
Back-transfer. Finally, after answering these questions, 
participants were asked how much (if any) of the tripled 
amount they wanted to return to the investor. All participants 
were debriefed by the end of the experiment and ten, randomly 
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Results and Discussion  
Choice. All results are shown in Table 4.5. When investor 
A was only slightly faster (after 25 seconds) than investor B in 
deciding to trust the money to the participant, the majority (46 
out of 66 or 70%) chose to divide the money with investor B 
(i.e., the investor with whom a participant could divide the 
largest sum of money namely €13.50 ). However, when 
investor A was much faster than investor B in deciding to trust 
the money to the participant, the majority favored investor A 
(33 out of 62 or 53%). This choice reversal was significant, χ² 
(1, N = 128) = 6.92, p = .009, φ = .23. These findings again 
corroborate the main hypothesis that people are not solely 
driven by the intrinsic properties of outcomes. Note that 
participants played an anonymous one-shot game (as opposed 
to repeated games) in which strategic- and reputational 
concerns cannot account for these findings.    
Perceptions of doubt. Although investor B always decided 
after 28 seconds to send the money to the participant, 
attributions of doubt depended on the speed in which investor 
A decided to hand his money. Specifically, investor B was 
perceived as more doubtful than A when investor A decided 
after 4 seconds (M = 5.81, SD = 0.99) as compared to when 
investor A decided after 25 seconds (M = 2.78, SD = 1.27), F (1, 
126) = 226.56, p < .001, η² = .64. These results are again 
compatible with the conjecture that the decision times of 
others implicitly communicate an agent’s doubt in sending the 
participant the money. 
Mediation analysis. It was earlier proposed that the effect 
occurs via perceptions of doubt. To test this conjecture, I ran a 
bootstrap analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with 5000 
bootstrapped samples. When perceptions of doubt were 
entered in the bootstrapped model, it comprised a significant 




interval excluding zero (1.3142 to 3.5448). Thus, the more 
doubt participants inferred from the investor’s decision, the 
less likely this investor was chosen to share money with.  
Back-transfer. Because the amount of money was less 
when dividing the sum with investor A (€12) than with 
investor B (€13.50), I first computed the back-transfer as a 
percentage of the tripled investment. The results indicated that 
the back-transfer depended both on the experimental condition 
and the chosen investor. Specifically, in the condition where 
investor A responded much quicker, participants selecting 
‘quick’ investor A in this condition returned more (45% of €12)  
than participants selecting ‘slow’ investor B ( 28% of €13.50 ), 
Mann-Whitney test, z = -4.060, p < .001, r = .52. Yet, in the 
condition in which investor A was only slightly faster, 
participants selecting investor A returned 48% (of €12) and 
those selecting investor B returned 35% (of €13.50), which 
was not statistically different, Mann-Whitney test, z = -1.840, p 














                                                          
2 Analyses on the average returns instead of the percentage of the tripled-investment yielded 
similar results. 




Choices to Interact with Investor A  (dividing €12) or Investor B (dividing 
€13.50), Perceptions of Doubt in Investor B, and Back Transfer in the two 
Decision Time Conditions, Experiment 4.6. 
 
  
             Speed in Trusting the Money to   
                            the Participant 
 
 
        A in 4 seconds 
      B in 28 seconds 
   A in 25 seconds 
  B in 28 seconds 
   
   
Choice to divide €12 with A          53%  (33/62)        30%  (20/66) 
Choice to divide €13.50 with B          47%  (29/62)        70%  (46/66) 
Perceptions of doubt in B          5.81      (0.99)        2.78      (1.27) 
Back transfer to A of €12       €5.81      (45%)     €5.75      (48%) 
Back transfer to B of €13.50       €3.78      (28%)     €4.73      (35%) 
 
 
Note: Preference for Investor A or B is the percentage of participants (frequency within 
parentheses) who chose to interact with Investor A or B respectively. Doubt perceptions are 
assessed on a 3-item 7-point scale, with higher scores indicating more perceived doubt in 
investor B. 
 
Experiments 4.7 & 4.8 
 
The prior results indicate that (1) people prefer to 
interact with parties who immediately respond to a situation 
while avoiding those who delayed their decision and (2) that 
this tendency is explained by the inferred doubt that the 
different decision speeds suggest. This may imply that there is 
an inherent positivity associated with immediate decisions 
while delayed responses are inherently negative. I propose that 
this is not always the case. Sometimes, the reverse may be true 
because people are often encouraged to interact with others 
who are in doubt while discouraged when other’s actions 
reveal a lack of doubt. For example, in negotiations, an offer by 




prefer to continue negotiating with a seller who immediately 
declined the offer or would she prefer the seller who declined it 
after a delay? I conjecture that in these situations, people prefer 
to negotiate with the delayed seller because the delay 
communicates that the seller doubted to accept the offer and is 
open for further negotiations (while an immediate rejection 
may be perceived as final and inflexible). Thus, although our 
previous findings suggest that people are more prone to 
interact with parties who immediately decided to accept the 
participant as trustee or employee, the reverse is true in the 
case of negotiations when sellers decline offers. The following 
two experiments were designed to test this conjecture. 
Experiment 4.7 was a scenario-based experiment in which 
participants were negotiating with two different sellers who 
declined a participant’s initial offer. Participants were 
subsequently asked with whom they wanted to continue 
negotiating. In Experiment 4.8, participants were again 
negotiating with two sellers, yet they made real choices instead 
of hypothetical ones.   
 
Experiment 4.7 
 Sixty members of the general public were recruited near 
the Tilburg University campus and were asked to imagine that 
they were looking for a second hand refrigerator. They were 
told that there were two sellers (Tom and Fred). The scenario 
in which Tom immediately declined the offer read as follows: 
 
Imagine you are looking for a second hand refrigerator 
and there are two sellers, Tom and Fred, both of whom 
want to sell their refrigerator. Both refrigerators are 
identical in brand and type. Moreover, both refrigerators 
are in an identical condition. Tom’s asking price is €90 
while Fred’s asking price is €100.  
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You decide to call both sellers to make them an offer. 
You offer them both an openings bid of €70. Tom 
immediately declines your offer. Fred declines your offer 
after 30 minutes.  
 
In the condition in which both sellers had identical 
decision speeds, both declined the offer after 30 minutes. After 
reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate with 
whom they wanted to continue negotiating.   
When both sellers declined the offer after 30 minutes, the 
majority of participants (22 out of 30 or 73%) preferred to 
continue negotiating with Tom whose initial asking price was 
lower than Fred’s price. Thus, other things being equal, people 
prefer to continue negotiating with a seller whose initial asking 
price is lower as opposed to higher. However, when Tom 
immediately declined the offer while Fred declined the offer 
after 30 minutes, the majority of participants (16 out of 30 or 
53%) preferred Fred as a negotiation partner, despite his initial 
higher asking price. This reversal was significant, χ² (1, N = 60) 
= 4.44, p = .04, φ = .27.  
These results extend our findings in an important way. 
Our previous results suggest that people favor parties who 
immediately decided to accept the participant as employee, 
roommate, or trustee. The present findings demonstrate that 
the reverse is true when a request is denied (e.g., when an offer 
is declined). More generally, decision speed serves as an 
implicit signal of doubt and uncertainty. In the present study, 
the longer decision time of Fred (in the experimental condition) 
suggests that he may be uncertain and thus, supposedly open 
for further negotiations, encouraging people to choose him as 
negotiation partner (despite his higher initial asking price). 
The goal of Experiment 4.8 was two folded: First, it was 




choice setting. Second, it was designed to test whether, as in 
Experiment 4.6, the effect of speed on choice is mediated by 
perceptions of doubt. However, while more perceived doubt 
decreased the likelihood that a trustor was chosen in 
Experiment 4.6, I expected that a doubtful seller is more likely 
to be chosen as negotiation partner since the inferred doubt 
supposedly signals that the declined offer approached the 




One hundred and one students (27 male) at Tilburg 
University participated in exchange for €8 (Mage = 21, SD = 
2.48). The current study was part of a set of unrelated studies. 
Upon arrival in the lab, participants were seated in separate 
cubicles and received instructions on the computer screen 
explaining that they were participating in an anonymous one-
shot negotiation game. Participants were told that they were 
assigned the role of buyer while two other participants were 
assigned the role of seller (in reality, the sellers were 
preprogrammed players). Subsequently they were told that 
both sellers, A and B, each received three new paper notebooks 
(for taking lecture notes) from the experimenter. The 
participant, in turn, received €10 from the experimenter with 
the goal of buying three paper notebooks from one of the two 
sellers. They were further explicitly informed that of all 
participants who participated that week (1) ten buyers would 
receive the paper notebooks plus the remaining amount after 
buying these notebooks and (2) ten sellers would receive the 
offer they accepted. Participants had ample time to read the 
instructions and were given the opportunity to ask clarification 
questions at any time. 
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After these instructions, both sellers started the 
negotiation by stating their asking prices. Specifically, 
participants saw on their computer screen that Seller A had an 
asking price of €8 for his paper notebooks while Seller B asked 
€9. After seeing these prices, a participant stated an opening 
offer (which was the same for both sellers). After stating their 
openings bid, participants  learned that both sellers had a 
maximum of sixty seconds to either accept or decline the offer. 
Two clocks (one for each seller) subsequently appeared in the 
center of the screen, counting from zero to sixty seconds. When 
one of the sellers made his choice, her clock stopped counting 
and the choice (accept or decline) appeared underneath the 
clock. Meanwhile, the clock of the other seller kept counting 
until she reached a decision to accept or decline the offer.  
In this experiment, both sellers declined the offer yet the 
decision speeds in reaching their decision was experimentally 
varied. In the large difference condition, Seller A (asking the 
lower price of €8) declined the offer after 3 seconds while 
seller B (asking the higher price of €9) declined it after 26 
seconds. In the small difference condition, seller A and B 
declined the offer after 23 and 26 seconds, respectively. In the 
identical condition, both sellers declined the offer after 26 
seconds.  
Choice. After seeing that both sellers declined the offer, a 
participant indicated with whom they wanted to continue 
negotiating (i.e., Seller A or B), which constituted the main 
dependent variable.    
Perceptions of doubt. Three items assessed a participant’s 
perceptions of doubt. Specifically, participants had to indicate 
the extent that  (1) seller B doubted more than seller A, (2) 
seller B thought that the offer was more acceptable than seller 
A, and (3) seller B was less certain than seller A in declining the 




7 = very) and were averaged into a doubt perception composite 
(α = .94).  
After answering these questions, a participant was asked 
to offer the seller a new bid (which was always accepted). All 
participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment and 
ten, randomly chosen, participants received the paper 
notebooks plus the money that they did not spent on buying 
these notebooks (€10 minus the accepted offer). 
 
Results and Discussion  
Choice. The results are presented in Table 4.6. When  both 
sellers declined the offer after 26 seconds (last column), the 
majority of participants preferred to continue negotiating with 
seller A whose initial asking price was relatively low (€8). 
However, when seller A rejected the bid almost immediately 
(first column – 3 seconds vs. 26 seconds), this pattern reversed 
and a large majority of participants preferred to continue 
negotiating with seller B. This reversal is significant, χ² (1, N = 
63) = 25.13, p < .001, φ = .63. In a similar vein, participants 
were more likely to continue negotiating with seller A in the 
3/26 seconds condition as compared to the 23/26 seconds 
condition, χ² (1, N = 70) = 18.19, p < .001, φ = .51. Finally, 
comparing the choice frequencies of the 23/26 seconds 
condition with the 26/26 seconds condition, people seem to 
prefer to continue negotiating with A to a larger extent, but this 
increase was not significant, χ² (1, N = 63) = 1.65, p = .19, φ = 
.16.3          
Overall, these findings again support the main hypothesis 
that people are not only driven by the intrinsic properties of 
outcomes (or initial asking prices) but also by the decision 
                                                          
3 In Experiments 4.3 and 4.4 I did notice a difference between the ‘small difference conditions’ 
and the ‘identical conditions’. Note that the trend in the current experiment  is in the same 
direction and a possible reason that I did not replicate these results may be due to a lack of 
power.   
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speeds of relevant actors. Importantly, these results replicate 
the results of Experiment 4.7, yet in a situation in which 
participants made real choices as opposed to hypothetical 
decisions.       
Perceptions of doubt. The results are presented in Table 
4.6. Although seller B always declined the offer after 26 
seconds, attributions of doubt in reaching this decision 
depended on the speed in which seller A declined the offer, F 
(2, 98) = 112.59, p < .001, η² = .70. Specifically, seller B was 
perceived to be more doubtful than A when seller A declined 
the offer after 3 seconds as compared to the condition in which 
seller A and B both declined the offer after 26 seconds, F (1, 61) 
= 325.87, p < .001, η² = .84. In addition, when seller A declined 
the offer after 23 seconds (second column), seller B was again 
perceived to be slightly more doubtful than A as compared to 
when seller A and B declined the offer after 26 seconds (third 
column), F (1, 68) = 57.20, p < .001, η² = .46. Finally, when 
comparing the 23/26 seconds condition with the 3/26 seconds 
condition, seller B was again perceived to be more doubtful, F 
(1, 67) = 50.30, p < .001, η² = .43.  Overall, these results 
corroborate the main hypothesis that the decision speed of 
others implicitly reveals an agent’s doubt in declining the offer.       
Mediation analysis.  To test the conjecture that decision 
speed is mediated by the inferred doubt that participants 
perceived in the actions of both sellers, I ran a bootstrap 
analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with 5000 bootstrapped 
samples. When perceptions of doubt were entered in the 
bootstrapped model, this was a significant mediator of the 
effect of decision speed on choice, B = 0.71, Z = 3.17, p = .002, 
with a 95% confidence interval excluding zero (-2.5903 to - 
0.4420). Thus, the more doubt participants inferred from the 
seller’s decision to decline the initial offer, the more likely this 




replicate the findings of Experiment 4.6 and support a ‘decision 
time as information’ perspective on the role of decision speeds 
in driving choice preferences. A relatively strong delay is 
evidently perceived as signal of doubt which people use in 
choosing among two choice alternatives. Note that unlike in 
Experiments 4.1 to 4.6, in the present experiment delayed 
decision times are actually preferred. In other words, 
immediate decisions may sometimes be conceived as 
encouraging and in other situations as discouraging. Regardless 
of how they are interpreted, our general proposal is that 




Preferences to Continue Negotiating with Seller A  (asking price of €8) or 
Seller B (asking price of €9) and Perceptions of Doubt in Seller B in the Three 
Decision Time Conditions, Experiment 4.8. 
  
                         Speed in Declining the Offer 
 
 
           A in 3 sec 
         B in 26 sec  
      A in 23 sec    
      B in 26 sec 
     A in 26 sec 
     B in 26 sec 
 
Preference for A (€8) 
          
         28%   (9) 
       
      79%   (30) 
      
     90%   (28) 
Preference for B (€9)          72%  (23)       21%    (8)      10%    (3) 
Perceptions of doubt B          5.39 (1.00)       3.19 (1.36)      1.23 (0.81) 
 
 
Note: Preference for seller A or B is the percentage of participants (frequency within 
parentheses) who chose to continue negotiating with seller A or B respectively. Doubt 
perceptions are assessed on a 3-item 7-point scale, with higher scores indicating more 











Study 4.9 examined whether different decision speeds 
would also affect choice preferences in a field setting. For this 
purpose, I examined the behavior of game show contestants, 
using data from the television show The Voice. The Voice is a 
talent show that is broadcasted in more than 50 countries. 
Contestants are aspiring singers and there are four different 
stages of competition. The first stage, the blind auditions, 
provides a unique opportunity to analyze whether game show 
contestants are sensitized to the time that multiple parties 
need in reaching a decision.  
The blind auditions constitute the first part of a show’s 
season in which four coaches (usually well-known singers) 
listen to contestants in chairs facing backwards as to avoid 
seeing the contestant. Each contestant has 2 minutes of singing 
time to convince one or more coaches to accept him or her in 
the coach’s team. When a coach is convinced by a contestant’s 
talent, they press a button which rotates the chair, signifying 
that the coach wants to work with the contestant (when a chair 
rotates, the bottom illuminates saying ‘I want you’). 
Importantly, when more than one coach presses their button 
during the song, the contestant eventually has to choose the 
coach he or she wants to work with. These features leaves the 
possibility that different coaches turn their chairs at different 
time points during a contestant’s song (Experiment 4.6 
essentially has the same design in which multiple trustors 
declared their trust in a participant at different time points). 
For example, imagine a contestant who enters the stage and 
starts singing. Coach A is convinced and turns his chair after 10 
seconds. Coach B is also convinced, yet after 90 seconds. Both 
coach C and D are not convinced and decide not to turn their 




or B)? Note that this is an important decision for a contestant, 
since the coach is crucial in developing and mentoring the 
contestant with the goal of winning the talent show. Given that 
people are sensitive to the decision speed of others, I predicted 
that the contestant in the example is less likely to favor coach B 
over coach A. I tested this hypothesis by examining whether the 
observed frequency that a coach is chosen who turned last is 
different than the probability that a coach is expected to be 
chosen by chance.  
 
Method 
I used the video-sharing websites YouTube and 
Dailymotion as recourses to find blind auditions of The Voice. 
In total, I analyzed the blind auditions of 6 seasons in 4 
different countries (The Voice U.S. 2011, 2012, The Voice 
Australia, 2012, The Voice UK, 2012, 2013 and The Voice of 
Holland, 2013. Unfortunately, not all auditions of the Voice of 
Holland 2013 were available. I therefore analyzed only those 
auditions that were available) in which there were 97 blind 
auditions in which at least two coaches turned their chair. 
These were the auditions of interest since now the contestant 
had to choose with whom they wanted to collaborate.4  
For each contestant I recorded (1) how many coaches 
turned their chair, (2) when each coach turned his or her chair 
(i.e., was he first, second, third, or fourth in deciding to turn his 
or her chair), (3) the contestant’s choice with whom he or she 
wanted to collaborate which constituted our main dependent 
                                                          
4 Note that there were more auditions in these seasons, yet either no coach turned their chair 
or only one coached turned. When no coach turned, the contestant was eliminated. When only 
one coach turned his or her chair, the contestant was automatically assigned to this coach’s 
team  and thus had no choice with whom to collaborate. In addition, there were also auditions 
in which multiple coaches chose to turn their chair at exactly the same moment, making it 
impossible to determine who turned first or last.    
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variable, (4) the contestant’s gender, and finally (5) the country 
and season in which the blind audition was aired.    
 
Results and Discussion 
There were three possible situations that a contestant 
could encounter: Either two, three, or four coaches turned their 
chairs, leaving a contestant with the choice between two, three, 
or four coaches respectively. According to our hypothesis, 
coaches who were last in deciding to turn their chair signaled 
the least degree of confidence in the contestant’s ability as a 
singer. I thus predicted that these coaches were least likely to 
be chosen as mentor. As can be seen in Table 4.7, when 
contestants had the choice between two coaches, 18 out of 54 
contestants (33%) chose a coach who turned last (i.e., second),  
4 out of 14 (28%) chose a coach who turned third in the ‘three-
coach situation’ while 4 out of 29 constants (14%) chose a 
coach who turned fourth in the ‘four-coach’ situation. The 
question is whether these observed frequencies are different 
from the frequency that a coach is expected to be chosen by 
chance. For the ‘two-coach’ situation, the expected frequency to 
be chosen by chance is 27 (54/2), in the ‘three-coach’ situation 
this is 4.66 (14/3) and when four coaches turned their chair 
this is 7.25 (29/4).  
Next, I tested whether the observed frequencies that a 
coach was chosen who turned last differs from the frequency 
that can be expected when chosen by chance. In testing this, I 
first aggregated the data to increase power and computed a 
modified z-score that takes two properties of the aggregated 
data into account, namely (1) that the expected frequency that 
a coach is chosen by chance is different for the three possible 
situations and (2) that there were more auditions in which two 




coaches turned.5 The result indicated that coaches who were 
last in turning their chair were less frequently chosen than 
expected by chance, Z = 2.75, p = .006 (two-tailed). Game show 
contestant in our sample were thus hesitant to choose a coach 
who was last in deciding that he or she wants to work with the 
contestant. These results extend the results of Experiment 4.6 
in which people were similarly hesitant to cooperate with 
trustors who decided to trust the participant with a delay. In a 
similar vein, game contestant presumably also perceived doubt 
in a coach who turned his or her chairs last, decreasing a 
contestant’s willingness to work with this coach. Obviously, 
field settings are noisy, yet given our previous experiments we 
feel confident to argue that at least part of a contestant’s choice 


















                                                          
5  Z = 
     ∑                     ∑                    
√(            ) (              ) (              ) 
 were the observed frequency is the frequency 
that a coach is chosen who turned last for each possible situation. The expected frequency 
refers to the frequency that can be expected for each situation when a coach is chosen by 
chance. The denominator is the standard error of the mean.  




Number of Times (Percentages in Parentheses) That a Coach Who Was Chosen 




Number of times that  
the coach who  
was chosen turned: 
               Number of Coaches Who Turned their  
                          Chair during the Audition 
         Two     
     turned 
        Three  
        turned 
      Four  






    5/14(36%) 
 
11/29(38%) 
Second  18/54(33%)     5/14(36%)   5/29(17%) 
Third  -     4/14(28%)   9/29(31%) 





In a series experiments I examined what information the 
decision speeds of others reveal and how people use this in 
choosing between multiple parties. Specifically, delayed 
decisions by others, as opposed to immediate decisions, were 
consistently interpreted as a sign that the actor was hesitant in 
reaching the decision. Because of the doubt that delayed 
decisions implied, people were either discouraged (Experiment 
4.1 to 4.6, and 4.9) or encouraged (Experiment 4.7 and 4.8) to 
choose the relatively slow party as interaction partner. For 
example, trustees were less likely to share money with a 
person who was relatively late in deciding to the trust this 
person (Experiment 4.6) while buyers were more likely to 




offer after a delay as opposed to immediately (Experiment 4.7 
and 4.8). These results support a ‘decision time as information’ 
proposition: People interpret the times that others need in 
reaching a decision as cues reflecting doubt in one’s decision, 
thereby influencing subsequent choices and judgments. These 
signs of doubt even led people to favor choice options that were 
normatively inferior. When choosing between multiple parties, 
individuals are thus responsive not just to the outcomes that 
different parties may bring, but also to how these parties 
reached their decisions.  
In fact, it is proposed that decision makers may, under 
certain circumstances, be caught in an internal conflict in which 
they have to resolve the tradeoff between choosing the 
maximal normative option and the potential uncertainty 
associated with it as derived from the cue concealed in the 
other party’s decision speed. This tradeoff can be expressed by 
the following two parameters model:  
  
Choice = F [(a * Outcome) + (b * others decision speed) + C] 
 
where choice is a function of the optimal outcome and the 
doubts associated with the decision speed of the other agent. 
The weights associated with these two parameters are a and b 
respectively (C is a constant). The weight a would be mainly 
determined by the extent to which the best option dominates 
the other (or second best, in case of more than 2 options) 
alternative. The weight a should be larger the further the 
dominating alternative is from the other option. For instance, in 
Experiment 4.1, if the salaries offered by companies A and B 
would be €40.000 and €50.000 respectively, a would 
supposedly be approaching its maximal value and will not 
likely be compensated by decision speed. In other words, there 
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is probably a tipping point at which people become insensitive 
to the difference in decision speeds.  
Several comments are in order. First, while the results 
support the conjecture that people perceive different response 
times in terms of doubt, I do not propose that this is the sole 
information contained in decision speed.  Different response 
times may reveal more than a person’s (lack of) doubt. For 
example, an immediate hiring decision may reveal (1) a lack of 
doubt in hiring the applicant which (2) communicates the 
company’s enthusiasm about the person (Experiment 4.1). In a 
similar vein, a seller who immediately declines an offer may, in 
addition to a lack of doubt, signal one’s anger or frustration in 
the low offer (Experiment 4.7 and 4.8). Thus, while response 
times are most likely always interpreted in term of doubt, 
context specific information may arise as a consequence of the 
inferred doubt.      
A final comment concerns a methodological point. In all 
our experiments I employed what Hsee (1996) has termed joint 
evaluation in which all the options are presented and are thus 
comparable. Whether our conclusion equally apply to separate 
evaluation remains an open question. Clearly, if one gets an 
immediate job offer decision time is obviously short. However, 
whether an offer received after 2, 5 or 10 days is perceived long 
may depend on the context. As a consequence, people may be 
less sensitive to decision speed under separate evaluation 
conditions.     
In theoretical terms, the decision time relation that is 
demonstrated in the present paper resembles a similar notion 
to what Hsee and Abelson (1991) termed “velocity relation”. 
These authors propose that a person’s satisfaction with an 
outcome depends on the velocity (i.e., rate) at which the 
outcome changes over time. For example, suppose that 




percentile to the 70th percentile over the past 6 weeks while 
that of student B rose from the 35th percentile to the 70th 
percentile over the past 3 weeks. Following Hsee and Abelson, 
student B’s outcome satisfaction should be larger than that 
obtained by student A. Though B’s standing has improved only 
by 35 points compared to A’s improvement of 40 points, B’s 
improvement velocity was much faster (3 weeks) than that of A 
(6 weeks). As in the model I proposed above, velocity of change 
can compensate for a somewhat lower outcome. As in our 
model, I speculate that once the difference in outcome exceeds 
a certain level, it cannot be compensated anymore by the speed 
or rate of change.     
There are obviously fundamental differences between 
the velocity relation and the notion of decision speed examined 
in the present paper. First, the velocity relation describes the 
relationship between satisfaction and velocity while the 
relation that I demonstrate focuses on choice preferences. 
Second, the velocity relation describes how people respond to 
dynamic changes in outcomes. Thus, in the velocity relation, 
there is always a change in the state of the outcome. In the 
decision time relation that I described, outcomes do not change, 
but a party’s decision to grant a person access to the outcome 
differs as a function of decision speed. Third, and perhaps most 
important, decision time in our case serves as a cue or a signal 
and as such thus influences choices, whereas velocity in Hsee 
and Abelson’s model is actually part of the outcome. 
Notwithstanding these differences, the two models resemble in 
that both deal with a tradeoff associated with outcome vs. time 
considerations.  
The present investigation contributes to a stream of 
research investigating how implicit signals that accompany 
actions affect behaviors and evaluations. For example, as 
discussed in the introduction, Critcher and colleagues (2013) 
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showed that people are sensitized to the decision speed of 
others when acting morally. A person who immediately decided 
to act morally was judged more positively than a person who 
similarly acted morally, yet after deliberating about it. In a 
similar vein, research by Galisnky and collegues (2002) showed 
that negotiators are less satisfied with the negotiated outcome 
when one’s first offer is immediately accepted. The current 
findings represent an important extension of these results. 
First, the above mentioned studies tested the role of decision 
speeds on evaluations while I tested its effects on choice 
preferences. This is an important extension since evaluations 
and choice do not always align (e.g., Ajzen, 1991). Second, I 
show evidence that, given identical decision speed, people 
prefer the dominating choice option. However, when the 
dominating option was relatively late in reaching a decision, 
people prefer the normatively inferior alternative instead. 
People evidently derive (dis)utility from the decision speeds of 
others. Finally, I show evidence that the choice reversal cannot 
be accounted for by other mechanisms like a ‘first come first 
served’ rule. Instead, our results are supported by a ‘decision 
speed as information’ perspective.  
On a final note, any decision making process can be 
characterized by the time with which a decision is made, yet 
only few have paid sufficient attention in illuminating its role in 
affecting choices. The present research is an initial step toward 
understanding this relationship by studying how outcomes and 
decision speeds interact in guiding choice preferences. More 
specifically, I examined the cues and signals afforded to 
decision makers by the decision speed of the other party. An 
open question for future research is the extent (and conditions) 
under which this signaling is a product of deliberate reasoning 















Summary and Discussion 
 
ocial interactions are complex and people often need to 
‘go beyond the information given’ in order to develop an 
understanding of the social situation. This process has 
important implications for people’s experiences and 
subsequent decisions. The studies in this dissertation 
contribute to our understanding of how people go beyond the 
information given by describing how they rely on various cues 
that frequently arise in social interactions. The aim of the final 
chapter is to provide a summary of the chapters and discuss the 
theoretical implications of the research presented in this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2: The insured victim effect 
 
Summary  
The first goal of the second chapter was to examine how 
people rely on characteristics of the victim when evaluating the 
severity of unlawful acts. Building on prior research indicating 
that people are guided by a ‘more-harm-deserves-more-
punishment’ imperative, it was hypothesized that people would 
punish identical crimes more mildly when victims were insured 
as opposed to uninsured. Experiment 2.1 demonstrated that 
people indeed would punish identical crimes less severely 
when a victim happened to be insured. In Experiment 2.2 
participants had to determine the sentence for the insured and 
uninsured case simultaneously and the results indicated that 





results suggest that people believe they should not differentiate 
between insured and uninsured victims but nonetheless 
become milder for perpetrators whose victims were insured 
when evaluating the cases separately. Experiment 2.3 extended 
these findings by ruling out that the insured victim effect is 
driven by the perpetrator’s foreknowledge while Experiment 
2.4 indicated that transgressions do not have to result in harm 
for the insured victim effect to present itself. Specifically, when 
harm was possible but not realized, people still punished 
crimes less severely when the (potential) victim was insured. In 
addition, Experiment 2.5 showed that punishment 
recommendations can even become more lenient for crimes 
that are in fact more serious but in which the victim was 
insured. Finally, Experiment 2.6 indicated that the insured 
victim effect is associated with a change in how people evaluate 
the severity of the transgression. That is, transgressions in 
which the victim happened to be insured are perceived to be 
smaller fouls than identical transgressions in which victims 
were uninsured.  
 
Discussion 
For decades, economists and psychologists have studied 
the consequences of insurance from the perspective of the 
insured party (e.g., intrapersonal moral hazard). Their 
emphasis on why insured individuals are more prone to expose 
themselves to risk has provided key insights into a hidden cost 
of this safety mechanism. Chapter 2 adds to this research 
stream by highlighting the interpersonal consequences of 
insurance and is intended as a first step in illuminating this 
relationship. Specifically, the findings in Chapter 2 add to a 
growing stream of literature in behavioral law, a perspective 
that challenges the rational actor assumption that is advocated 
by many legal scholars. This relatively new approach favors a 
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more accurate conception of (legal) decisions that is 
descriptive, rather than normative, stressing important 
‘bounds’ on human decision making (e.g., Jolls, Sunstein, & 
Thaler, 1998). For example, normative theories of choice 
assume that people have stable and consistent preferences, 
regardless of how the preferences are elicited (Hsee, 1996). 
However, almost all experiments in Chapter 2 indicated that 
punishments reversed when people evaluated the insured and 
uninsured case either jointly or separately, challenging this 
fundamental premise.  
 
Chapter 3: The hidden cost of insurance 
 
Summary  
Whereas the role of insurance is explored in the legal 
domain in Chapter 2, the third empirical chapter investigated 
its role in trust relationships. The studies in this chapter 
provide evidence for a hidden cost of insurance in situations 
requiring trust: Trustees are more likely to betray trustors 
when the trusting party chooses to be insured against the risk 
of betrayal. The presumed safeguard against the risk of 
betrayal thus paradoxically increased the probability of 
betrayal. Experiment 3.1 provided initial support for this idea. 
Experiment 3.2 extended these findings by ruling out that the 
observed decrease in cooperation can be accounted for by a 
mere change in the payoff structure for trustors who are 
insured. In a similar vein, Experiment 3.3 demonstrated that 
trustees only became less willing to cooperate when the trustor 
was insured by choice and not by chance. Finally, Experiment 
3.4 indicated that trustors realize that choosing to be insured 
will decrease the trustees ‘willingness to cooperate, yet they 






Chapter 3 contributes to a stream of research 
investigating how risk management mechanisms (e.g., 
contracts and fines) interfere with developing relationships 
based on trust and this chapter represents an important 
extension to prior findings. Specifically, although both contracts 
and insurance policies are designed to minimize risk, they do so 
in very different ways. Contracts minimize risk by restricting 
the actions of trustees such that it becomes costly for a trustee 
not to cooperate. Contracts thus minimize risk by decreasing 
the probability that trustees betray trust. An insurance policy 
does not restrict the actions of trustees but minimize risk by 
mitigating the resulting costs if betrayal occurs. These different 
safety mechanisms thus decrease the risk of betrayal by each 
targeting different components of the risk equation (i.e., risk = 
probability of betrayal x the resulting cost when it happens). 
Chapter 3 provides a first demonstration of how lowering risk 
by mitigating the costs of betrayal hinders cooperation. 
Importantly, the results indicate that trustees become less 
cooperative because by choosing insurance, trustor’s signal 
distrust, encouraging trustee’s to defect. These results again 
support the idea that people ‘go beyond the information given’ 
and derive meaning from the acts of others. 
 
Chapter 4: Decision time as information 
 
Summary 
The last empirical chapter investigated the role of another 
cue that frequently arises in interdependent situations, namely 
the decision time of others. The results of nine studies 
indicated that delayed decisions by others, as opposed to 
immediate decisions, were consistently interpreted as a sign 
that the actor was hesitant in reaching the decision. Because of 
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the doubt that delayed decisions implied, people were either 
discouraged (Experiment 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.9) or 
encouraged (Experiment 4.7 and 4.8) to choose the relatively 
slow party as interaction partner. The results supported a 
‘decision time as information’ hypothesis: People interpret the 
times that others need in reaching a decision as cues reflecting 
doubt in one’s decision, thereby influencing subsequent choices 
and judgments. These signs of doubt even led people to favor 
choice options that were normatively inferior. When choosing 
between multiple parties, individuals are thus responsive not 
just to the outcomes that different parties may bring, but also 
to how these parties reach their decisions.   
 
Discussion 
Although decisions are intimately related to various 
aspects of time, most prior research looked at the role of time 
in choice from the decision maker’s point of view (i.e., 
intrapersonal consequences of time in choice). Chapter 4 takes 
an interpersonal perspective and is a first initial step in 
illuminating how the decision time of others affect 
interpersonal choices. This is important because any decision 
can be characterized by the time with which it is made and the 
decisions of others are no exception. The findings in Chapter 4 
indicate that people perceive the decision speed of others as 
indicative of the degree of doubt the person experienced which, 
in turn, influenced a variety of social interactions and decisions.   
 
   Concluding remarks and future directions 
 
Many characteristics of others with whom we are 
interacting with now, or plan to interact with in the future, are 
not directly perceivable. For instance, is the other person 




reach a compromise or not. These characteristics can be 
intentionally suppressed or simply hard to observe. Hence, we 
often need to rely on implicit cues to form an impression about 
the intentions, motives, or goals of others. Throughout this 
dissertation, I have shown how and when people are guided by 
such cues when choosing with whom to cooperate or negotiate 
or whom to punish. Although the cues examined in this 
dissertation are distinctively different from each other, they all 
possess a key feature: they transmit information. The findings 
presented in the empirical chapters clearly reveal that (1) a 
victim’s harm is perceived as indicative of the seriousness of 
the crime, (2) a trustor’s decision to protect oneself is 
perceived as an act of distrust, and (3) the decision time of 
others is taken as a sign of doubt. Whether these cues are 
indeed valid indicators of these constructs, or whether the 
inferences that recipients of these cues make are correct, 
constitute of course different questions. Future research is 
needed to address the conditions under which these cues can 
be considered as reliable sources of information. Chapter 2 may 
already have provided a first hint to answer this question by 
suggesting that a recipient’s evaluation mode (separate or 
joint) may be an important factor when evaluating the validity 
of the transmitted cue (i.e., does it adequately represent the 
construct of interest) .  
A related question is whether these signals are 
transmitted intentionally or unintentionally by the sender. 
Signals and cues are communication tools that are fundamental 
for understanding both human and other primates behavior. 
Indeed, there is a large literature on the role of signals and cues 
in animal behavior (e.g., Getty, 1998; Zahavi, 1975). 
Supposedly, the signaling and cueing in the animal domain is 
automatic rather than intentional. Where human behavior is 
concerned, the issue is more complicated since signaling can 
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take place with and without awareness. Presumably, the cues 
examined in the present thesis occurred mainly at the 
unconscious level. It seems likely that the signals sent out by 
people in everyday life can also serve a strategic role and hence 
may be sent out intentionally. Future research should provide 
more insight in the conditions under which cueing and 
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